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THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MCCARRAN
AMENDMENT: AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHETHER
CONGRESS INTENDED FOR STATE COURT JURISDICTION
TO EXTEND TO INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
BY
DYLAN R. HEDDEN-NICELY*

"

The year 1976 marked a sea change in federalpolicy regardingthe
treatment ofAmerican Indian tribes and their waterrghts In thatyear,
the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates was called upon to determine
the scope of the McCarran Amendnent, a rder on a federal
appropriationsbill that waived the sovereign immunity of the United
States in state court general stream adjudications "where it appears
that the United States is the owner or is in the process of acquiring
water rghts by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by
exchange, or otherwise."The Supreme Court, in what has been called a
"clear example of judicial legislation," interpreted that language to
grant state courtjurisdictionfor the determination of Indian reserved
water rights. In so doing, the Court abandoned the "deeply rooted"
federal policy of "leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and
control, "andhas subjected the tribes to "hostile[state court]forums in
which [the tribes] must be preparedto compromise their [water right]
claims.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the legislative history of
the McCarran Amendment-the available Congressional Record, the
Senate Report, as well as the HearingMinutes--in an effort to ascertain
whether it was Congress's intent to include Indian reserved water
rights within the scope of the McCarranAmendment
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The legislative history indicates that "the McCarranAmendment
was meant to be interpreted narrowly, not broadly. " It demonstrates
that the Senators'actual concern had not to do with federal reserved
water ihts but instead that the United States, acting in a proprietary
rather than sovereign capacity, had been acquiringan ever-increasing
number of state law water rights but was refusing to enterstate court
proceedings to either adjudicate or administer those nghts As the
presense of the federal government increasedin the river basins of the
West, the proponents of the McCarranAmendment became increasinly
alarmed that federal claims of sovereign immunity would effectively
preclude state courts from enforcing state water law, thereby causing

"theyears of building the water laws of the Western States .

. [to] be

seriouslyjeopardized"
Farfrom a general waiver, the legislative history reveals that the
sponsors of the McCarranAmendment intended to address only this
narrow but politicallyexplosive problem where the United States was
claiming a 'fprivilege of immunity that the oriinal owner wouldn't
have." Indian reserved water rights, which are reserved by the federal
government in its sovereign capacityfor the benefit ofIndian tribes that
have sovereign immunity independent of the United States, do not
appearto have been consideredorintended to be includedby Congress
as the McCarranAmendment was passedinto law.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Between 1971 and 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States
rendered three opinions that forever changed the legal landscape in Indian

Country. In what has been called "a clear example of judicial legislation,"'
the Court considered an obscure rider on an appropriations bill that came to
2
be known as the McCarran Amendment, and found that it allowed for state

1 Mary Wallace, The Supreme Court and Indian Water Rights, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 197, 210 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985).
2 Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 495, § 208, 66 Stat. 549, 560 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666
(2012)). In its entirety, the McCarran Amendment reads:
(a) Joinder of United States as defendant; costs
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the
administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or
is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase,
by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United
States in any such suit.
(b) Service of summons
Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney General
or his designated representative.
(c) Joinder in suits involving use of interstate streams by State
Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of the United
States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United States involving the
right of States to the use of the water of any interstate stream.
Id
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court jurisdiction to determine federal and Indian reserved water rights.3 In
so doing, "[t]he Court reviewed a legislative history that is inconclusive at
best and created a new federal policy."4
The impact of the Court's decisions cannot be overstated. The Supreme
Court has long recognized a "deeply rooted" policy in the United States that
Indian tribes and their rights are to be free from state court jurisdiction.'
There is good reason for this: Indian tribes "owe no allegiance to the states,
and receive from them no protection." 6 Nowhere has this maxim been more
pronounced than in the determination of reserved water rights. The root of
this treatment is that Indian tribes often have prior rights to water that has

3 See inra PartIV.
4 Wallace, supra note 1, at 210.
5 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
6 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
7 See, eg, In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System (Big Horn 1), 753 P.2d 76, 99-100 (Wyo. 1988) (reversing the finding of the Special
Master that the purpose of the Wind River Reservation was to create a permanent homeland for
Shoshone and Arapahoe Indians, and instead finding that the sole purpose of the reservation
was agricultural, and that the Winters v. UnitedStates, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908), doctrine does
not include any rights to the use of groundwater); In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Big Horn River System (Big Horn 111), 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992) (finding
the Wind River tribes may not convert agricultural water rights to instream flow rights, despite
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit precedent expressly authorizing tribal
changes in use, without complying with state law); Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 169 P. 121, 128 (Or.
1917) (limiting the water rights of the Umatilla Tribes to water necessary for domestic and
livestock water rights); State exrel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 248-51 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)
(awarding a water right for irrigated agriculture for just 2,322.4 acre-feet out of a claim by the
Tribe of 17,750 acre-feet after imposing unprecedented market limits on certain crops used by
the Mescalero Tribe in making its claim under the practicably irrigable acreage quantification
standard); Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d 1306, 1310
(Wash. 1993) (finding that although the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakama Nation
reserved a water right for fish with a time immemorial priority date, that right had been
substantially diminished, and the Tribe was only entitled to a quantity for the "minimum
instream flow necessary to maintain anadromous fish life in the river, according to annual
prevailing conditions") (the Yakima Nation renamed itself the Yakama Nation in the mid-1990s);
In re SRBA (Snake River Basin Adjudication), No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022, slip op. at 47
(Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 1999) (finding the Nez Perce Tribe's claims for instream flows for fish
were inconsistent with the purpose of the Nez Perce Treaty of 1855, which guaranteed the Tribe
the continued right of "taking fish at all usual and accustomed places," as well as finding,
despite federal court precedent to the contrary, that the Nez Perce Reservation had been
diminished by an agreement between the United States and the Tribe in 1893); see also Robert
H. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal
Judisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1127 (1978) (examining the
impact of state court jurisdiction on the determination of reserved water rights, and arguing the
primary forum should continue to be federal courts because of the possibility of state bias, the
tribal perception of state courts, the historical basis for special treatment of Indians, and the
federal trust responsibility over Indian property); Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting
Colorado River Conservation District v. United States-There Must be a Better Way 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 597, 615 (1995); Michael C. Blumm et al., The Mirage oflndian Reserved Water Rights and
Western Streamilow Restoration in the McCarranAmendment Era:A Promise Unfulfflled, 36
ENVTL. L. 1157, 1160 (2006) [hereinafter Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water
Rghts]; Michael C. Blumm et al., JudicialTermination of Treaty Water Rights. The Snake River
Case, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 449, 450-452 (2000).
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long been used by non-Indian appropriators.' This creates conflict between
tribal and non-Indian water users and the primary forum to resolve such
conflict now rests in state courts that are "ill-equipped to deal with the
political pressures arrayed against tribal efforts to reclaim water that ha[s]
been used by the non-Indian community."' This pressure can cause state
courts to develop "strong incentives to discriminate against federal claims in
favor of state and private uses."0 The ultimate outcome is that tribes are
often forced "into hostile forums in which [they] must be prepared to
compromise their claims.""
The question this Article addresses is whether Congress intended for
this tectonic shift in federal policy regarding Indian tribes. It will explore the
language and legislative history of the McCarran Amendment in an effort to
ascertain its true purpose.
That legislative history shows that "the McCarran Amendment was
meant to be interpreted narrowly, not broadly."" Indeed, the language of the
McCarran Amendment, together with its legislative history, suggests that the
true policy underlying the McCarran Amendment was to address a narrow
but politically unacceptable issue that was occurring throughout the West
leading up to the early 1950s: the rapidly expanding United States
government was acquiring state law water rights at an unprecedented rate
but was refusing to be joined to state court proceedings that were seeking to
8 Abrams, supranote 7, at 1146 n.217.
9 McElroy & Davis, supra note 7, at 600.
10 Abrams, supranote 7, at 1111.
11 Blumm et al., The Mirage ofIndian Reserved WaterRights, supra note 7, at 1161; see, e.g.,
United States v. State, 23 P.3d 117, 125-29 (Idaho 2001) (finding no water right for the
reservation of ninety-five islands within the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge for the purposes
of maintaining riparian habitat and to foster isolation of migratory birds from predators, despite
acknowledging "[b]y definition an island is surrounded by some amount of water"); State v.
United States, 12 P.3d 1284, 1286-91 (Idaho 2000) (finding that Congress did not imply a federal
reserved water right for either the wilderness portion or the nonwilderness portion of the
Sawtooth National Recreation Area, despite its stated purposes to "assure the preservation and
protection of the natural, scenic, historic, pastoral, and fish and wildlife values and provide for
the enhancement of the recreational values associated therewith" (quoting Act of Aug. 22, 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-400, § 1(a), 86 Stat. 612, 612 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460aa(a) (2012))); Potlatch
Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1263-68 (Idaho 2000) (finding that the Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C. §§1131-1136 (2012), reserved no water rights after having previously found the
Wilderness Act had impliedly reserved all unappropriated flow (as of the creation of the areas)
within Idaho's three wilderness areas); United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199, 1204-07
(Idaho 1999) (finding that the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§528-531
(2012), which broadened the purposes for which the national forests are to be managed, did not
reserve "new" water rights because the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act did not create a new
reservation of land); United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 494-97 (Colo. 1987) (finding that
Congress did not intend to reserve instream water rights for the purposes of securing sufficient
water to furnish "a continuous supply of timber" for the San Isabel and Pike National Forests);
United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 24-27 (Colo. 1982) (concluding that
Congress did not intend to reserve "additional water for the existing national forests with a 1960
priority date for recreational and wildlife conservation purposes" pursuant to the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act, despite its broadening the purposes for which national forests are to be
managed).
12 Wallace, supra note 1, at 210.
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either adjudicate or administer those water rights. The proponents of the
McCarran Amendment argued that the federal government's claim of
sovereign immunity precluded state courts from either initiating an
adjudication or administering previously decreed water rights that were
subsequently acquired by the United States.' 3 This, according to the
proponents of the bill, effectively paralyzed the states' ability to enforce
their water laws because "all the supposedly settled water rights [were]
subject to review and reexamination," whenever "the United States
appear[ed] in a watershed." 4 The upheaval caused by the federal
government's actions created considerable anxiety that "the long years of
travail through which the water laws of our Western States have pased
[sic] ...

have been in vain."'

The sponsors of the McCarran Amendment believed the federal claim of
sovereign immunity unfair because, in those circumstances where it had
acquired water rights pursuant to state law, the United States was acting in a
proprietary rather than sovereign capacity but nonetheless claiming a
"privilege of immunity that the original owner wouldn't have."" It was this
issue, which had nothing to do with Indian tribes whose rights are reserved
by the United States in its sovereign capacity and who have sovereign
immunity independent of the United States" that was front and center as the
McCarran Amendment was considered and passed into law.
II. THE FUNDAMENTALS: RESERVED WATER RIGHTS VS. STATE LAW WATER RIGHTS

A typical water user in the United States acquires his or her water rights
pursuant to state rather than federal law. The history of this arrangement
derives from a series of federal acts, which culminated with the Desert Land
Act of 1877. The Desert Land Act allowed for federally-owned public
domain "desert lands" within certain states to be acquired by United States
citizens." However, the Act also contained the disclaimer:

13 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 5 (1951).

14 A Bill to Authone Suits Against the United States to Adjudicate and Administer Water
Rights: Hearingon S 18 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 82d Cong. 22 (Apr. 25, Aug. 3-8, 1951) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Glen G.
Saunders attorney representing the National Reclamation Association).
15 Id. at 48 (statement of W.T. Mathews, Att'y Gen. of the State of Nevada).
16 Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Arthur V. Watkins (R-Utah)).
17 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

§ 7.05[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)

[hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK]; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004)
(holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2, did not preclude
prosecution of the defendant by the federal government on the basis of his prior prosecution by
the Spirit Lake Tribe because "the Tribe acted in its capacity of a separate sovereign"); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978) ("Indian tribes are 'distinct political communities'
with their own mores and laws ... which can be enforced by formal criminal proceedings in
tribal courts as well as by less formal means.") (internal citations omitted).
18 Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (2012)).
19 Id. § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)).
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That the right to the use of water by the person ... on or to any tract of desert
land . . shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation; and such right shall
not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for
the purpose of irrigation and reclamation; and all surplus water over and above
such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers,
and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable,
shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for
20
irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.
Based upon this language, the United States Supreme Court determined
that "following the act of 1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a
part of the public domain became publcijuis, subject to the plenary control
of the designated states.""
All arid and semi-arid states in the West have adopted some form of the
prior appropriation doctrine.22 The prior appropriation doctrine is based
upon the maxim that first-in-time is first-in-right: "[w]ater rights are ranked
in the order that the right was acquired, and this priority schedule is used to
2
distribute available water in times of shortage." 3
The basis of a water right under the prior appropriation doctrine is
beneficial use.2 4 The Supreme Court has described it this way:
[O]ne acquires a right to water by diverting it from its natural source and
applying it to some beneficial use. Continued beneficial use of the water is
required in order to maintain the right. In periods of shortage, priority among
confirmed rights is determined according to the date of initial diversion.22
Thus, the quantity of appropriative rights is limited to the amount a
6
person actually diverts and puts to a beneficial use. Prior appropriation
jurisdictions apply the "use it or lose it" rule, meaning the water right is
subject to forfeiture for nonuse." Finally, there is no shared shortage; in
times of scarcity, the most senior user gets their entire quantity of water
before the next most senior receives any water.
Reserved water rights are different. Reserved rights are one of two
exceptions to the general rule of state plenary authority over water rights."
20

Id
&

21 Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935).
22 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 19.01[1]; A. DAN TARLOcK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
RESOURCES § 5:3 (2016).
23 TARLOcK, supranote 22, § 5:32.
24 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States (Colorado River), 424 U.S. 800, 805
(1976).
2 5 Id
26 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, §19.01[1].
27 Id.; TARLOCK, supranote 22, § 5:90.
28 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, §19.01[1].
29 See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) ("First,
that, in the absence of specific authority from Congress, a state cannot, by its legislation,
destroy the right of the United States as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the
continued flow of its waters, so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the
government property."). The second exception is the navigational servitude. Id. Acts governing
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The basis for reserved water rights for Indian tribes are the treaties,
executive orders, congressionally ratified agreements, and other operative
documents that were negotiated between the United States and each Indian
Tribe for the creation of Indian reservations.0 Because reserved water rights
are treaty rights, the United States and the tribes set them aside pursuant to
their sovereign capacity.3
Most agreements between Indian tribes and the United States are
entirely silent regarding water rights. This silence was first addressed in
32
Winters v. United States.
That case involved the Fort Belknap Reservation,
which was created by congressionally ratified agreement in 1888." However,
the agreement did not discuss water rights.3 Shortly after the Reservation
was created non-Indian irrigators began diverting water from the Milk River,
which was a primary water supply for the Reservation.35 In 1905, a drought
caused water supply to diminish below the amount necessary to supply both
the tribes and the non-Indian irrigators, causing the United States to bring
suit."
The non-Indian defendants argued that the silence in the Agreement as
to water rights should be construed to mean that the tribes and United
States did not intend for any water rights to be reserved along with the Fort
Belknap Reservation." They argued the tribes should get their water by
appropriation pursuant to the laws of the State of Montana and that since
the non-Indians had begun using the water first, they were the prior
appropriators."
The Court disagreed. It stated that "[t]he case, as we view it, turns on
the agreement of May, 1888, resulting in the creation of Fort Belknap
Reservation."3 ' The Court then found:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters-command of all their
beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing roving herds of stock,"
or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this?
Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the waters which

made it valuable or adequate? . .

If it were possible to believe affirmative

water and other rights on public lands do not extend to water use on federal reservations held
by the United States. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 446-48 (1955).
30 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 19.03[1].
31 E. DE VATIEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 160 (James
Brown Scott, ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Press of Gibson Bros. 1916) (1758) ("A treaty... is
a compact entered into by sovereigns for the welfare of the state.... Treaties can only be
entered into by the highest State authorities, by sovereigns, who contract in the name of the
State.").
32 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
33 Id. at 567-68.
34 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 19.02.
35 Id
36

Id

Wintels, 207 U.S. at 576 ("[It is contended, the means of irrigation were deliberately
given up by the Indians and deliberately accepted by the Government.").
38 Id. at 568-69.
39 Id at 575.
37
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answers, we might also believe that the Indians were awed by the power of the
40
government or deceived by its negotiators. Neither view is possible.
The Court applied the Indian law canons of construction to imply a
water right despite no express language in the agreement:
By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians,
ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. And
the rule should certainly be applied to determine between two inferences, one
of which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other impair or
defeat it. 41
The Court found that "[t]he power of the Government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not
denied, and could not be." 42 Ultimately, the Court concluded that "the
government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use which would
be necessarily continued through years. This was done May 1, 1888."
Winters v UnitedStates forms the basis for what is now known as the
Winters doctrine. Winters rights are owned by the United States in trust for
45
the tribes" and are determined pursuant to federal rather than state law.
The doctrine is one of implied rights; the intent to reserve water "is inferred
if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the
purposes for which the reservation was created."" The doctrine originally
applied only to Indian tribes but was subsequently applied to non-Indian
federal reservations as well.47 Critical to the legislative history discussion to
come: since these rights were reserved pursuant to treaty, the United States
reserved them in its sovereign rather than proprietary capacity."
The primary difference between state law water rights and reserved
water rights under the Winters doctrine is that "[u]nlike appropriation rights,
reserved rights are not based on diversion and actual beneficial use. Instead,
sufficient water is reserved to fulfill the purposes for which a reservation

40 Id. at 576.
41 Id. at 576-77.
42 Id. at 577.
43 Id
44 Id
45 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 19.05[1].
46 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976). Cappaert also held that reserved

water rights may be expressed rather than implied. Id.
47 See id. at 138, 141 (applying the doctrine of implied rights to a tract of land surrounding
Devil's Hole, a detached component of the Death Valley National Monument, to preserve a rare
species of desert fish); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (recognizing that the
doctrine of implied rights extends to National Recreation Areas and National Forests). Notice
that the first time the Winters doctrine was applied to a non-Indian federal reservation was a
full ten years after the passage of the McCarran Amendment. This important point begs the
question of how the framers of the McCarran Amendment could have intended its scope to
include something they did not know existed.
48 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 19.03[4].
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was established."" This necessarily includes water for current and future
needs." As a result, reserved rights "may be asserted at any time; and they
are not lost through nonuse."" Further, reserved rights, just like state law
rights, have a priority date:
But the priority of reserved rights is no later than the date on which a
reservation was established, which in the case of most Indian reservations in
the West, is earlier than the priority of most non-Indian water rights. Thus, a
reservation established in 1865 that starts putting water to use for agricultural
purposes in 1981 under its reserved rights has, in times of shortage, a priority
that is superior to any non-Indian water right with a state law priority acquired
after 1865. For these reasons, Indian rights are generally prior and paramount
to rights derived under State law.
Because Indian reserved water rights are invariably prior to state law
rights, the quantity Indian tribes are entitled to is potentially large, and
because tribal rights "are often put to actual use long after appropriation
rights are established, the exercise of tribal water rights has the potential to
disrupt non-Indian water uses.", 3 As a result, "[t]o the extent that reserved
rights can be narrowly construed, important state economic interests are
served .... Thus, state judges in water rights adjudications will be under
strong pressure to rule against the federal government's reserved rights
claims."' This pressure creates a risk that "state courts may prove incapable
of protecting the important federal policies that underlie the reserved rights
doctrine and will deprive the United States and Indian groups of vital water
rights."55 This existential threat to reserved rights is the reason for the
"deeply rooted" federal policy "of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction
and control."`
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE DETERMINATION OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
BEFORE THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT

Indian tribes, like the United States, enjoy sovereign immunity.57
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that precludes lawsuits against the
§ 19.01[1].
50 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601.
51 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 19.01[1].
52 Id. (footnote omitted). But see, United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362-63 (9th
Cir. 1983) (restricting the priority date for some irrigation water rights appurtenant to certain
lands within the reservation that had that had been sold to non-Indians and subsequently
reacquired by the Tribe).
53 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 19.03[1].
54 Abrams, supranote 7, at 1131-32.
55 Id. at 1131.
56 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
57 See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2028 (2014) ("Among the core
aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess ...
is the 'common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.'" (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 58 (1978))); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (applying
49 Id.

2016]

INDLIN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS

855

sovereign absent its consent.' "The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is
rooted in federal common law and reflects the federal Constitution's
treatment of Indian tribes as governments in the Indian commerce clause.""
Only Congress may waive the sovereign immunity of the United States,
and that waiver "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." 0
Likewise, tribal sovereign immunity may only be waived by the tribal council
or abrogated by Congress." Congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity once again "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed."" Similarly, a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity by a tribal
council "must be 'clear.'"
The policy considerations supporting tribal sovereign immunity are
manifold. Tribal sovereign immunity is "a necessary corollary to Indian
sovereignty and self-governance." The doctrine protects treaty rights and

tribal sovereign immunity to preclude suits against Indian tribes even for tribal conduct
occurring off-reservation); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.,
498 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1991) (holding that a suit filed by Potawatomi tribe for an injunction
against the Oklahoma Tax Commission did not waive the sovereign immunity of the Tribe with
respect to counterclaim filed by the Commission to enforce its tax code); Santa Clara Pueblo,
436 U.S. at 58-59 (holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (2012), did
not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity for tribal members to sue their tribes in federal court
over alleged civil rights violations); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165,
173 (1977) ("[C]ertainly, the mere fact that the Tribe has appeared on behalf of its individual
members does not affect a waiver of sovereign immunity for the Tribe itself."); United States v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940) (finding prior decree affirming a cross-action
against the United States acting as trustee for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations void and
subject to collateral attack because neither the United States nor the Tribes had waived their
sovereign immunity to a cross-action by initiating a lawsuit); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S.
354, 357-58 (1919) ("Like other governments ... the Creek Nation was free from liability for
injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace.").
5
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 7.05(1] [a] ("Indian tribes are immune from lawsuits
or court process in both state and federal court unless 'Congress has authorized the suit or the
tribe has waived its immunity." (quoting MAowa Tibe of Okla., 523 U.S. at 754)). A notable
exception to this general rule is the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows suits for specific
relief against federal officials acting outside the scope of their authority or pursuant to an
unconstitutional statute. ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). The Supreme Court has
indicated the Exparte Youngdoctrine may be applicable to tribal officials acting in their official
capacity as well. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 7.05[1][a] (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U.S. at 59).
59 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, § 7.05[1][a] (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
60 United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
61 MRowa 7ribe, 523 U.S. at 754 ("As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity").
62 Santa ClaraPueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1972)).
6 C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418
(2001) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991)).
64 Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877,
890 (1986).
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resources, which the United States has a duty to protect.65 Sovereign
immunity serves as a critical shield that "protects tribes' often weak
economic foundations from erosion by eliminating costs associated with
defending lawsuits; it is therefore critical to the development of strong tribal
economics and other tribal and federal interests."66
Sovereign immunity traditionally kept Indian tribes and their water
rights out of state court. Before 1976, the United States would "proceed ...
as plaintiffs or ... appear specially" in order to "evidence to the court the
interest [of the United States] ." Ultimately, "the matter [would be] settled
on the basis of stipulating [the federal] rights as they relate to all others,""
and "a decree is entered recognizing those interests." This process typically
gave Indian tribes control of when and where its rights would be quantified.76
It allowed tribes to develop the funding necessary to engage in a water rights
adjudication.n Further, since these adjudications were not typically general
adjudications, the number of parties involved was more manageable and

65 Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of 7ibalSovereign Immunity Under
Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a hnaamental Aspect of
American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 688 (2002).
66

Id. at 739.

Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of William H. Veeder, Special Assistant to the
Att'y Gen. of the United States).
67

68 Id. at 3.
69 Id. at 4.
70 An unfortunate exception to this general proposition arises when the United States,
against whom tribes do not have sovereign immunity, initiates lawsuits for the adjudication of
tribal rights without the consent or participation of the tribes. For example, the United States
initiated a federal court water rights adjudication in 1913 on behalf of both the Pyramid Lake
Paiute as well as the Newlands Reclamation Project. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 116
(1983). The Pyramid Lake Paiute were not a party to the adjudication. The United States
"claimed 10,000 cubic feet of water per second for the project and a claim to 500 cubic feet per
second for the Reservation." Id. 500 cubic feet per second was not sufficient for the Tribe's
needs, and it became apparent the United States favored its fiduciary obligations to the federal
irrigation project over those of the Tribe. Id at 116, 119, 141. Nonetheless, when the United
States attempted to later claim additional water on behalf of the Tribe, the Supreme Court
found it was barred by res judicata. Id. at 145. This case hails from a different era when the
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes looked much different than today. It
nonetheless underscores the many competing interests of the United States and the need for
tribal involvement in water rights adjudications to adequately protect tribal interests.
71 The fact that the water rights of an Indian tribe may be haled into state court at any time
has drastic impacts on tribal economic development. Although the United States enters
adjudications on behalf of the tribes, the national policies often take precedence over the needs
of an individual tribe. Because of this, tribes are often compelled to hire their own legal counsel
to ensure their rights and interests are adequately represented. However, it is "the policy of the
Department of the Interior not to use federally appropriated funds to pay for private counsel to
represent Indian tribes." 25 C.F.R. § 89.40 (2015). Although there are exceptions to that policy,
id § 89.41, tribes typically pay a large portion of the costs to defend their water rights in state
court. This places the tribes, often the poorest communities in the nation, in an impossible
position. They can repurpose funds often earmarked for economic development to their water
rights effort-assuming such funds exist-or they can rely upon the United States to sufficiently
protect their rights.
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could be litigated in less time and at less expense." Most importantly, it
allowed the tribes to make their case in federal court.
It was against the backdrop of this firmly entrenched precedent that the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the scope of the McCarran
Amendment included the reserved water rights of the United States and
America's Indian tribes.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's slow expansion of the McCarran Amendment took
place over twelve years and three decisions. The process began with Uhited
States v. District Courf (Eagle County), wherein the Court found that nonIndian federal reserved water rights for the White River National Forest
were included within the scope of the McCarran Amendment.' The Court's
analysis turned on an examination of section (a) of the McCarran
Amendment, 5 which states in part:
72 In comparison, general adjudications are massive undertakings. For example, Idaho's
Snake River Basin Adjudication commenced in 1987, and the final unified decree was entered
on August 25, 2014, and contained 158,591 water right decrees. Clive J. Strong, SRBA
Retrospective: A 27-YearEffort ADvOCATE, Nov./Dec. 2014, at 28, 28 (Idaho State Bar). Of those,
about 130,500 partial decrees were based upon state law and about 15,000 were disallowed state
law water rights and claims. Id. It also contained 1,346 water right decrees based upon federal
law. Id. Importantly, approximately 11,700 additional federal law claims were disallowed. Id. In
coming to this final decree, the court handled 43,822 contested cases, the Idaho Supreme Court
issued 36 opinions, and the United States Supreme Court issued one opinion. Id The SRBA is
said to have been the fastest of its kind. Adjudications in Wyoming and Washington took
approximately 37 years to determine 25,000 and 3,000 claims respectively. Id. Meanwhile, the
Montana general stream adjudication, which commenced in 1979 and expects to include
approximately 219,000 water right claims, is not expected to conclude until 2028. Id at 29 n.2.
Similarly, in Arizona, approximately 82,000 claims have been filed in the Gila River
Adjudication, which commenced in 1974 and is currently about 33% completed. Id at 29 n.3.
Likewise, the Little Colorado Adjudication commenced in 1978 in Arizona state court, contains
around 14,000 claims, and is approximately 55% complete. Id. The Arizona adjudications have
been called a "procedural nightmare." McElroy & Davis, supra note 7, at 613. New Mexico has
thirteen adjudications currently ongoing, all of which were commenced between 1956 and 1970.
Strong, supranote 72, at 29 n.4.
7 401 U.S. 520 (1971). A companion case to Eagle County was United States v District
Court( WaterDivision No. 5), 401 U.S. 527 (1971). However, the Court's analysis in that decision
was limited primarily to referencing Eagle County Id. at 529. Although additional issues were
raised, they were limited to specific questions regarding Colorado's adjudication procedures.
74 Eagle County 401 U.S. at 522-23.
75 Id. at 523-24. Both the United States and the respondents briefed the legislative history
of the McCarran Amendment in Eagle County The United States argued that the legislative
history supported the conclusion that the Amendment only implicated state law water rights.
Brief for Petitioner at 24-30, Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (No. 87). The respondents, on the other
hand, argued the legislative history included all water rights owned by the United States,
including reserved rights. Brief for Respondents and Intervenors at 11-39, Eagle County, 401
U.S. 520 (No. 87). The Respondent's arguments were based primarily upon: remarks regarding
sections of the bill that were not ultimately adopted, statements made by the representatives
from the Departments of Interior and Justice, as well as a remark made by Senator McCarran
indicating that purpose of the Amendment was to provide certainty that all water rights in a
particular basin were comprehensively determined. Id Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not
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Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,
*or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the
United States is a necessary party to such suit. 6

The Court began by splitting section (a)(1) from the remaining language
in the Amendment and reading it in isolation. Although section (a)(1) does

nothing more than define one of the two types of proceedings wherein the
United States

has waived its sovereign

immunity-a general stream

adjudication-the Supreme Court concluded the language "'rights to the use
of water of a river system' is broad enough to embrace 'reserved' waters.""
Based upon this interpretation of section (a)(1), the Court concluded that
the McCarran Amendment "would seem to be all-inclusive."7 8
The Court then turned to section (a)(2). It read the remaining language

as a single provision and then concluded "[t]his provision does not qualify
§ 666(a)(1), for (1) and (2) are separated by an 'or.""' However, just two
sentences later, the Court concluded "'the administration of such rights' in

§ 666(a)(2) must refer to the rights described in [a](1) for they are the only

ones which, in this context 'such' could mean; and, as we have seen, they are
all-inclusive."" In other words, the Court concluded that although the

limiting language found after section (a)(2) did not apply to section (a)(1),
the "all-inclusive" language found in section (a)(1) expanded the more
limited language in section (a)(2).
This enabled the Court to reject the United States' application of the
doctrine of ejusdem geneis to argue that the McCarran Amendment was
only applicable to the adjudication of state law rights. U/usdem genens

applies "when specific words are followed by a general term such as 'or
otherwise' and works to limit the objects encompassed by the general term

to the same class as those specifically enumerated."" The Supreme Court
acknowledged

that the terms "by appropriation under state law," "by

purchase," and "by exchange," "would normally be appropriative rights.". As
such, ejusdem genezis should have required the term "or otherwise," be
limited to other forms of state law rights. However, the Court refused to
apply ejusdem geneis to section (a)(1) because, as they read it, section
seem to rely upon any legislative history, opting instead to engage in a pure statutory
construction analysis in coming to its conclusion that the McCarran Amendment included nonIndian federal reserved water rights.
76 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012).
77 Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 523.
78

[d

79 Id at 524.

8

Id

81 James W. Dilworth & Frederic I. Kirgis, Jr., Comment, Adjudication of Water Rights

Claimed by the United States-Appicadon of Common-Law Remedies and the McCarran
Amendment of 1952, 48 CAL. L. REV. 94, 110 (1960); see also NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER,
2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

82 Eagle County 401 U.S. at 524.

§ 47.17 (7th ed.

2015).

INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS

2016]

859

(a)(1) was not qualified by the language found after section (a)(2). This
allowed the Court to conclude that, "we deal with an all-inclusive statute
concerning 'the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system,
which, in § 666(a)(1), has no exceptions and which, as we read it, includes
8
appropriative rights, riparian rights, and reserved rights.'
Eagle County did not involve Indian water rights, but, just five years
later the State of Colorado returned to the Supreme Court in ColoradoRiver
Water Conservation District v. UnitedState? (Colorado River), to ask it to
determine "whether the McCarran Amendment provided consent to
determine federal reserved rights held on behalf of Indians in state court.""
The Court "conclude[d] that the state court had jurisdiction over Indian
8 6
water rights under the Amendment."
In so determining, the Court did away with the confusing and
convoluted statutory analysis from Eagle County and instead simply found
that:
[Eagle County] held that the provisions of the McCarran Amendment ...
subject federal reserved water rights to general adjudication in state
proceedings .... More specifically, the Court held that reserved rights were
included in those rights where the United States was 'otherwise' the owner.
Now having apparently acknowledged that the "or otherwise" language did
apply to section (a)(1) of the McCarran Amendment, the Court did not go
back and analyze whether ejusdem generisshould limit that general term to
state law rights, consistent with the specific terms listed "by purchase" and
"by exchange."
While the Court acknowledged that "Eagle County... did not involve
reserved rights on Indian reservations,"" it nonetheless failed to apply the
"eminently sound and vital canon" of interpretation that ambiguities in
federal statutes affecting Indian tribes are "to be liberally construed [with]
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."" That canon

83
84
85
86
87
88

Id
424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Id. at 809.
Id
Id. at 810 (citing Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 524).

Id

89 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976) (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976) and Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S.
78, 89 (1918)); see also County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) ("When we are faced with these two possible constructions [of
a statute], our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this
Court's Indian Jurisprudence: '[Sltatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians,
with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit."' (second alteration in original) (quoting
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985))); N Cheyenne 7hbe, 425 U.S. at 656
(reaffirming the "judicially fashioned canon of construction that these statutes are to be read to
reserve Congress's powers [to abrogate tribal rights] in the absence of a clear expression by
Congress to the contrary"); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71, 174-75
(1973) (determining that unless expressly provided by Congress, state laws are generally not
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did not apply in Eagle County because no tribe was involved but was
necessary in Colorado River. However, the Court ignored this longstanding
precedent and found that "viewing the Government's trusteeship of Indian
rights as ownership, the logic of [Eagle County] clearly extends to such
rights."90
The Court concluded that Congress intended for the McCarran
Amendment to include Indian reserved water rights because the "underlying
policy [of the McCarran Amendment] dictates a construction including
Indian rights in its provisions."' The Court found the policy of the
Amendment was to be "an all-inclusive statute concerning the adjudication
of rights to the use of a river system ... [tihis consideration applies as well
to federal water rights reserved for Indian reservations."9
The Court could point to no express legislative history that indicated
Congress intended for the Amendment's waiver to include Indian water
rights.13 Instead it pointed to a statement from the Senate report that
indicated that "[i]n the administration and the adjudication of water rights
under State laws... all water users on a stream, in practically every case,
are interested and necessary parties to any court proceedings."" The Court
ignored the plain language of the Senate report that clearly limited its scope
to water rights acquired under state law. Instead, the Court argued that the
"ubiquitous nature of Indian water rights in the Southwest," leads to the
applicable to Indians on a reservation, and any ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the
Indians); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956) ("Doubtful expressions are to be resolved
in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon
its protection and good faith." (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832)));
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1930) ("[Ijn general tax exemptions are not to be
presumed and statutes conferring them are to be strictly construed ... the contrary is the rule
to be applied to tax exemptions secured to the Indians .... Such provisions are to be liberally
construed"); Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89 (stating as a "general rule[,] that statutes
passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally construed,
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians"); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675
(1912) (holding that statutory "construction ... is liberal; doubtful expressions ... are to be
resolved in favor [of the Indians]").
90 ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. at 810.
9
1 Id.
92 Id (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
93 A review of the briefing in ColoradoRiver demonstrates that although the United States
analyzed the legislative history, it did not analyze whether the legislative history demonstrated
that Congress intended for the McCarran Amendment to include reserved water rights held in
trust for Indian tribes. Brief of the United States at 22-30, Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800 (Nos. 74940, 74-949). Instead, the federal analysis of the legislative history primarily focused on the
separate question of whether the McCarran Amendment precluded the United States from
initiating water rights adjudications in federal court. Id In contrast, the Colorado River Water
Conservation District extensively briefed the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment,
highlighting the few places in that history that indicated Indian reserved water rights were
included within the Amendment's scope. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 15-30, ColoradoRiver,
424 U.S. 800 (Nos. 74-940, 74-949). Those instances included the language of the Senate Report
and the remarks of the Department of the Interior that the Supreme Court ultimately cited to
support its conclusion that the McCarran Amendment included Indian reserved water rights.
94 ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. at 810-11 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. No. 82-755,
at 4-5

(1951)).
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conclusion that "a construction of the Amendment excluding those rights ...
would enervate the Amendment's objective."" The Court then concluded its
analysis of the legislative history with a negative inference, stating that "the
Senate report on the Amendment took note of a recommendation in a
Department of the Interior report that no consent to suit be given as to
96
Indian rights and rejected the recommendation." Based upon this scant
legislative history, the Court concluded that the "underlying policy" of the
Amendment "dictates a construction including Indian rights."" A curious
conclusion from a Court that, a few weeks later, would require "some
[affirmative] mention" by Congress where "such a sweeping change in the
status of tribal government and reservation Indians [is allegedly]
98
contemplated by Congress."
9
The final case, Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Thbe of Arizona, (San
Carlos Apache 7hibe) was decided seven years later. There, the Court
addressed the question of whether "concurrent federal suits brought by [the
San Carlos Apache Tribe and the Northern Cheyenne], rather than by the
United States, and raising only Indian claims, [are] subject to dismissal
under the doctrine of ColoradoRive?""o The Tribes and the United States
made several arguments that a stay of their federal suit would not be
appropriate:
(1) Indian rights have traditionally been left free of interference from the
States. (2) State courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights. (3) The McCarran
Amendment, although it waived United States sovereign immunity in state
.

comprehensive water adjudications, did not waive Indian sovereign immunity.

. . (4) Indian water rights claims are generally based on federal rather than

state law. (5) Because Indian water claims are based on the doctrine of
'reserved rights' and take priority over most water rights created by state law,
they need not, as a practical matter, be adjudicated inter sese with other water
rights, and could simply be incorporated into the comprehensive state decree
at the conclusion of the state proceedings.101

Id. at 811.
96 Id. at 812.
95

97 Id. at 810.
98 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976). The Court in Bryan was asked to

determine whether the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)), granted congressional authorization for states to tax tribal
trust lands. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375. In determining that it did not, Justice Brennan, who also
authored the Court's decision in ColoradoRiver, found that "the total absence of congressional
intent [in either the text or legislative history of the Act of Aug 15, 1953] ... has significance in
the application of the canons of construction applicable to statutes affecting Indian
immunities." Id at 381. Justice Brennan concluded that "some mention would normally be
expected if such a sweeping change in the status of tribal government and reservation Indians
had been contemplated by Congress." Id
99 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
100 Id. at 549.
101 Id at 567-67.
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The Court found that while "[e]ach of these arguments has a good deal
of force ... [they all] founder on one crucial fact: If the state proceedings
have jurisdiction over the Indian water rights at issue here, as appears to be
the case, then concurrent federal proceedings are likely to be duplicative
and wasteful, generating 'additional litigation through permitting
inconsistent dispositions of property."'o
Although the Court pointed out that "the fact that a federal suit was
brought by Indians on their own behalf and sought only to adjudicate Indian
rights should be figured into the balance,"'o it nevertheless determined that
adjudication of Indian rights in federal court "will be neither practical nor
wise as long as it creates the possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and
controversy between the federal and state forums, hurried and pressured
decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property rights.",o
Ultimately, the Court found that "the most important consideration in any
federal water suit concurrent to a comprehensive state proceeding," was not
its "deeply rooted" policy of "leaving the Indians free from state
jurisdiction," 0 ' but instead "must be 'the policy underlying the McCarran
Amendment"' of avoiding piecemeal litigation."'
Both the Tribe and the United States argued against this by pointing to a
seemingly reasonable solution: the federal court can determine the Indian
water rights while the state court determines the non-Indian federal rights
and state law rights."' Once the Indian rights are determined, they could be
incorporated into the final state decree."' In answer to this suggestion, the
Court stated "[t]he problem with these scenarios, however, is that they
assume a cooperative attitude on the part of the state courts, state
legislatures, and state parties which is neither legally required nor
realistically always to be expected.""' In other words, the Court implicitly
reaffirmed its long held understanding that Indian tribes "receive ... no
protection" from the states or their courts."' However, rather than using this
as a reason to narrowly construe state court jurisdiction over Indian tribes,
as it normally would, the Supreme Court used it in this case as a reason to
liberally construe state court jurisdiction to the detriment of the tribal
parties.
The Supreme Court concluded by reiterating:
2

We also emphasize, as we did in Colorado River, that our decision in no way
changes the substantive law by which Indian rights in state water adjudications
must be judged. State courts, as much as federal courts, have a solemn
obligation to follow federal law. Moreover, any state court decision alleged to
102
103

Id. at 567 (footnote omitted) (quoting ColoradoRver, 424 U.S. at 819).
Id. at 569.

104
105
106

Id

107
108

Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 569 (quoting ColoradoRver, 424 U.S. at 820).
Id at 568.
Id

109 Id. at 568-69.

110 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
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abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if
brought for review before this Court, a particularized and exacting scrutiny
commensurate with the powerful federal interests in safeguarding those rights
from state encroachment."'
The Court's decision that the "or otherwise" language in the McCarran
Amendment includes reserved water rights was ultimately driven by its
conclusion that the policy underlying the McCarran Amendment was to be
an "all-inclusive statute concerning the adjudication of rights to the use of a
river system""1 in order to avoid piecemeal litigation." However, the
legislative history suggests the intent was for the McCarran Amendment to
be much narrower in scope.
V. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE TRUE POLICY UNDERLYING THE MCCARRAN
AMENDMENT
To support its ultimate conclusions in Colorado River, the Supreme
Court relied upon two facets of the legislative history: statements from
representatives of the executive branch and a single out-of-context
statement from the Senate Report that "[i]n the administration of and the
adjudication of water rights under State laws . .. all water users on a stream,
in practically every case, are interested and necessary parties to any court
is inconclusive at
proceedings."" However, this "legislative history ...

best."'

This alone should have directed a different result in light of the

Supreme Court's "eminently sound and vital canon[s]""' that statutes
affecting Indian tribes "be liberally construed, [with] doubtful expressions
being resolved in favor of the Indians.""m Furthermore, none of the legislative
history cited by the Court contained any affirmative statement that Congress
intended for the waiver to include reserved rights. One would expect at least
if such a sweeping change in the status of tribal
"some mention ...
8
government and reservation Indians had been contemplated by Congress.""
However, most importantly, the legislative history-when considered as a
whole-does not seem to support the Supreme Court's ultimate conclusions.
Instead, it demonstrates that "the McCarran Amendment was meant to be
9
interpreted narrowly, not broadly.""

The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment-often referred to
as S. 18-can be broken into four component parts. First, the record

111 San CarlosApache Thbe, 463 U.S. at 571.
112 Id. at 550-51 (quoting ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976)).
113 ColoradoRver 424 U.S. at 823.

114 Id. at 810-12 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. No. 82-755, at 4-5 (1951)).
115 Wallace, supranote 1, at 210.
116 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976)).
117 Id (quoting Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)); see also cases
cited supranote 89.
118 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381.
119 Wallace, supranote 1, at 210.
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contains information regarding a number of events that led to and
precipitated the call for the development of the McCarran Amendment."
These events are important because they drove the development of the law,
and therefore interpretation of the McCarran Amendment should be
considered through the context of those events. Second, the Senate held
three days of hearings, headed by Senator Arthur V. Watkins (R-Utah).' In
addition to those hearings, the bill was debated on the floor of the Senate by
Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nev.)."2 The hearings and the debate are rich with
statements made by the Senators, as well as both the proponents and
opponents of the proposed bill, which are very probative as to the purpose
and intent behind the bill. Third, the Senate published a report on the
proposed bill.' 2 ' Finally, the executive branch, through the Department of
Justice and Department of the Interior, provided their interpretation of the
effect of the bill."' The executive branch's analysis of the bill is important
because it was a primary factor in the Supreme Court's examination of the
legislative history of the McCarran Amendment. It also exposes a tension
between the executive branch and Senate in their respective interpretation
of the McCarran Amendment.
A. The Events thatLed to the Call for CongressionalAction
The CongressionalRecord contains mention of three separate water
controversies, all in the West, that seem to have precipitated the
development of the McCarran Amendment. These controversies arose on the
Quinn River in Nevada (Senator McCarran's home state), in several
adjudications in Colorado, and in the Santa Margarita River watershed in
California. Importantly, in all three cases, the United States had acquired
state law water rights through either purchase or by appropriation under
state law, and then proceeded to use its sovereign immunity to preclude any
state court adjudication or administration of those rights. This irresponsible
and unfair practice acted to paralyze the state courts' ability to control state
law water rights in those basins, which created significant political backlash
against the United States and likely resulted in Congress taking action and
passing the McCarran Amendment.

120 See infra Part V.A.
121 See infra Part V.B.1.
122 See infra Part V.B.2.

123 SeeinfraPartV.C.
124 SeeinfraPartV.D.
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1. The Quinn River, Nevada: The UnitedStates PurchasesState Law Rights
but Refuses State CourtJurisdiction
The Quinn River is a small intermittent river located in the
northwestern portion of Senator McCarran's home state of Nevada."' It is
approximately 100 miles long and has a drainage area of approximately 6,710
square miles.' However, the region is very arid and water is scarce in the
Quinn River watershed. In 2015, the Quinn River had an average annual
discharge of approximately eight cubic-feet-per-second (cfs), as measured at
7
the United States Geological Survey Gage located near McDermitt, Nevada. "
8
The flows drop to around two cfs between July and September."
The relative scarcity of water in this watershed has long caused
controversy." An adjudication of the water rights in the basin commenced
in 1907."' "Several years after the entry of the decree the United States,
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, United
States Government, purchased certain lands and water rights on the Quinn
River.""' After the United States purchased these rights, a dispute arose
regarding the decree:
[The Indian Service], as user of said three water rights and lands . . was made
party defendant by order of the State court.... The Indian service objected to
the jurisdiction of the State court, notwithstanding its water rights had
theretofore been adjudicated by that court, prior of course to the purchase
thereof by the United States ....
The United States removed the case to federal court, which held the
sovereign immunity of the United States precluded state court jurisdiction."'

125 U.S.
Bureau
of
Land
Mgmt.,
Quinn
River
Valley
100K
Quad,
http://www.nv.blm.gov/LandRecords/map.php?quad=quinn-river-valley (last visited Nov. 19,
2016).
126 U.S. Geological Survey, Boundary Descriptions and Names of Regions, Accounting
United and Cataloging Units, http://water.usgs.gov/GIS/huc_name.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2016).
127 U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Annual Statistics for Nevada,
3000
1&amp;
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nv/nwis/annual/?referred-module=sw&anp;site-no=1035
por_103530001_103017=2692792,00060,103017,2014,2016&amp;year-type=W&amp;format=htl
table&amp;dateformat=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb-compression=file&amp;submittedform
=parameter_selection list (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (U.S. Geological Survey Gage No.
103530001).
128 U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Monthly Statistics for the Nevada,
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nv/nwis/monthly/?referred module=sw&amp;site-no=103530001&am
p;por103530001103017=2692792,00060,103017,2014-07,2016-05&amp;format=htmltable&amp;
dateformat=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb.compression=file&amp;submitted form=parameter.
selection-list (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (U.S. Geological Survey Gage No. 103530001).
129 Hearings, supranote 14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews).
130 Id
131 Id
132 Id. at 47-48.
133 Id. at 48.
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The case was remanded back to the state court and, as of the hearings on
S. 18, "the action ha[d] not proceeded further."'m
A number of commenters have speculated that this controversy directly
led to the drafting of the McCarran Amendment.11 In the hearing on the bill,
William H. Veeder, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United
States-who was tasked with testifying against S. 18 on behalf of the
Department of Justice-made the comment that "Mr. Skeen's client in
Nevada and he and I talked about that client a long time, and Mr. Skeen
admitted he was a little worried about the statute of limitations in that case,
and that is why he drew up the bill and submitted it to Senator McCarran for
introduction. He is the one who drew the bill."3 6 The record also contains a
letter from the Attorney General of the State of Nevada, W.T. Mathews,
supporting S. 18 and providing information on the Quinn River situation.3 1
Much of that letter was ultimately incorporated into the official Senate
Report on S. 18.138
2. The ColoradoAdjudications: The UzitedStates Acquires State Law Water
Rights Pursuantto the ReclamationAct but Refuses State Court
Jurisdiction
Starting in the late 1800s through 1969, Colorado's practice was to
adjudicate water rights on a rolling basis in seventy water districts.

39

Some

of these districts contained federal irrigation projects that had been
developed pursuant to the Reclamation Act.' Importantly, the Reclamation
Act requires the United States to acquire water rights for irrigation projects
pursuant to state law."' One such adjudication took place in the early 1940s
in Colorado Water District Number 36, which is the district that includes the
Blue River,1 4 2 a primary source of Denver's water supply.'" Initially, the
United States entered the case and filed claims.'" However, it later withdrew
134

Id
135 See, e.g, Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 104.
136 Hearings, supra note 14, at 14 (statement of Mr. Veeder). Interestingly, the record is not
clear on who the fabled Mr. Skeen is. In fact, for someone credited with being the author of the
McCarran Amendment, Mr. Skeen is markedly absent from history.
137 Id at 44-49 (statement of Mr. Mathews).
138 Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 104.
139 Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado's l969Ad/udicationandAdministrationAct: SettlingIn, 3
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 3, 5-9 (1999).
140 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616yyyy (2012).
141 Id. § 383; see also California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665 (1978) ("From the
legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 it is clear that ... the Secretary would have to
appropriate, purchase, or condemn necessary water rights in strict conformity with state law.").
142 Hearings, supranote 14, at 26 (statement of Mr. Saunders).
143 Denver Water, Water Supply http://www.denverwater.org/SupplyPlanning/WaterSupply/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
144 Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (describing the statement of Mr. Saunders). The record is
not clear what claims were filed by the United States. However, the Bureau of Reclamation
administers the Green Mountain Dam located on the Blue River for irrigation purposes, which is
part of the Colorado-Big Thompson Reclamation Project. Bureau of Reclamation, Green
Mountain Dam, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/index.php?id=174 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). That
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from the state court proceeding and initiated a new suit in federal court.
Glenn G. Saunders, the attorney representing the National Reclamation
Association before the Senate hearing, also represented parties that were
"on the other side" of the United States in the Water District Number 36
adjudication."' He argued that:
The United States came into this proceeding, and the whole thing could have
been decided so far as district 36 was concerned in that proceeding, but at a
later time the Department of Justice ... withdrew from the proceeding. Later
the United States started a new proceeding of its own in the United States
district court... .1

Mr. Saunders also highlighted the situation in Colorado Water District
Number 51, which includes the Colorado-Big Thompson irrigation project.ln
Mr. Saunders stated that "the city and county of Denver has completely
adjudicated water rights which run down south and over into Denver. Those
water rights are completely adjudicated."'" 9 Subsequent to that decree, the
United States filed suit in federal district court seeking to
quiet the title of the United States for itself with reference to the city and
county of Denver and others ... and declare their respective rights subject and
subordinate to the rights of the United States with respect to the Colorado-Big
Thompson project, and forever erjoin them or any of them from encroaching
5
upon or in any way interfering with those rights.' o

According to Mr. Saunders, "the prayer of [the United States']
complaint ... would stop us from exercising adjudicated rights.... In effect
this complaint requires us to refitgate in the United States district court
every waterright that we have adjudicated"
3. Santa MargaritaRiver, California. The UitedStates PurchasesState Law
WaterRightsand then Commences a FederalCourt GeneralStream
Adjudication
By far, the controversy that received the most attention during
consideration of S. 18 was the "socialistic growth"'52 of federal authority over
water rights that "nearly caused a revolution" in the Santa Margarita

dam was constructed between 1938 and 1943. Id. It is likely that the claims filed by the United
States were for water rights appurtenant to this project.
145 Hearings,supranote 14, at 26 (statement of Mr. Saunders).
146 Id. at 26 (statement of Mr. Veeder).
147 Id. at 26 (statement of Mr. Saunders).
148

Id. at 30-31.

149 Id,
150 Id at

31.

Id. (emphasis added).
152 Letter from George F. Yackey, Gen. Manager, Fall Brook Pub. Util. Dist., to the Fall
Brook Pub. Util. Dist. (June 15, 1951), in Hearings, supranote 14, at 77.
151
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watershed in the early 1950s.'5 According to the United States Geological
Survey, the Santa Margarita River is a small intermittent stream with a
drainage area of just 723 square miles above the gage located near Ysidora,
California.1 The recorded average annual flow of the Santa Margarita River
has been as high as 337 cfs in 1993, and as low as 3.13 cfs in 2013.'" The
United States Geological Survey's mean monthly statistics indicate that the
flow in the stream gets as low as 2.8 cfs in August and 2.3 efs in September.'
The Santa Margarita River flows through Camp Pendleton, the "West
Coast's Premiere Expeditionary Training Base" of the United States Marine
Corps.' The United States purchased the Santa Margarita Rancho in the
early 1940s for the purpose of developing a 135,000 acre base to house and
train 28,000 marines. 58 As part of that purchase, the United States acquired
state law water rights that had been previously decreed by a California state
court.`" Consistent with California law, the Rancho had been decreed a
riparian right to 66.6% of the water in the stream while another major land
owner was to receive the remaining 33.3%.16' However, according to the
Saturday Evening Post the two large landowners, "respecting tradition so
hoary that it amounts to common law in the State... , recognized the water
rights of all the other farmers along the way."' 6 As of 1951, the Santa
Margarita serviced approximately 16,000 water users in addition to the Camp
Pendleton Marine Base. 62
Shortly after developing the base, the United States initiated a federal
lawsuit where it "asked that its title be quieted to the water [of the Santa
Margarita River]. It ask[ed] [for] 35,000 acre-feet, which ... is probably in
excess of the total water available in the stream.,"" This suit caused

153 GLEN G. SAUNDERS, REFLECTIONS ON SIXTY YEARS OF WATER LAW PRACTICE 31-32 (1989).
154 U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Annual Statistics for the Nation,

http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/annual/?referredmodule=sw&amp;site-no=11046000&amp;por11046000_7845=2207600,00060,7845,1923,2016&amp;yearitype=W&amp;format=html_table&arn
p;datejformat=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb-compression=file&amp;submittedform=parameter
selectionlist (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
155 Id
156 U.S.

Geological Survey, USGS Surface-Water Monthly Statistics for the Nation,
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/monthly?referred-module=sw&amp;site no=1 1046000&amp;por
11046000_7845=2207600,00060,7845,1923-03,2016-05&amp;format=html-table&amp;date
format=YYYY-MM-DD&amp;rdb.compression=fle&amp;submittedform=parameter_selection
list (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
157 W. Rivers Conservancy, Santa Margarita River, http://www.westernrivers.org/project
atlas/santa-margarita-river/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016); U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Base
CampPendleton, http://www.pendleton.marines.mil/(last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
158 Hearings, supra note 14, at 38 (statement of Rep. Samuel W. Yorty (D-Cal.)); Ed
Ainsworth & Cameron Shipp, The Government's Big Grab, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 5,
1952, reprintedin98 CONG. REC. 125 (1952).
159 Ainsworth & Shipp, supra note 158, at 126.
160 Id
161 Id
162 Stanley

High, Washington Tyranny: Another Case Study,
reprintedin 98 CONG. REC. 124 (1952).

READER'S DIG., Dec.

1951,

163 Hearings, supra note 14, at 38 (statement of Rep. Yorty). 35,000 acre-feet in a year
amounts to an average flow of 48 cubic feet per second, year-round.
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considerable political backlash. Two articles were read into the
CongressionalRecord that best exemplify public sentiment regarding this
adjudication. The first, found in the Reader's Digest was entitled
Washington Tyranny: Another Case Study." The second was a Saturday
Evening Post article entitled The Government's Big Grab.'" The Reader's
Digestarticle opened with the following story:
One day last April a United States marshal served a summons on Joe Hayes,
an irrigation farmer living near Fallbrook, Calif. Hayes was informed that the
Federal Government had laid claim to his privately owned water rights. The
Government proposed to take over, without compensation, his entire water
supply; and, to legalize this confiscation of his property, it had brought suit
against him.
The story went on to point out:
In addition to the farmers of the area, there are other defendants: The
Fallbrook Methodist Church, which uses water for drinking purposes for its
Sunday school; the Odd Fellows Lodge, which uses water in its kitchen and for
the cemetery which it owns; the board of trustees of the Fallbrook Union High
School; Ruth Lillie, who owns neither land nor water rights but uses water in
her home in a Federal housing project; Mary Hubbard, a 90-year-old widow
whose sole supply of water is brought in buckets by her neighbors.

While, according to the Saturday Evening Post article, there were
"helicopters bearing Government engineers and surveyors hovering over the
land and frightening the farmers,"" the base was using its water "not only
for thirsty Marines but for the maintenance of an 18-hole golf course ...
[and] for watering the crops of a number of commercial flower growers to
whom the Navy has leased Government land."6"' The article argued the base
didn't need the water from the Santa Margarita because "Pendleton's supply
7
of water, most of it pumped from wells, is at present ample." e Finally, it
argued that when water does become scarce, the "long-time answer to Camp
Pendleton's water needs is not the Santa Margarita River at all but the
Colorado [River].""'

Given this, the Reader's Digest article concluded that the suit was not
about water rights but about setting "a revolutionary precedent.""' Coming
164 High, supranote 162.
166

Ainsworth-& Shipp, supranote 158.
High, supra note 162, at 164.

167

Id

165

Ainsworth & Shipp, supranote 158, at 125.
169 High, supra note 162, at 124.
168

170
171

Id
Id

172 Id. The fear of the local people and politicians was based, in large part, upon some
verbiage that was included in the complaint. Specifically, the complaint asked "[t]hat this court
declare and determine that all of the rights of the United States of America are paramountand
superior to those of the named defendants by virtue of the riparian character of the lands above
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to a similar conclusion, the Saturday Evening Post argued that "the
Fallbrook case is also a matter of national consequence: if the Federal
Government can, by sovereign authority, take California water, then it might,
by the same reasoning and authority, take anything anywhere."'73 Both

articles quoted Pennsylvania Representative John Saylor as saying "if this
attempt succeeds ... then the whole historic pattern of the United States is
changed and there is no telling when they may move into the coal fields of
Pennsylvania or the oil fields of Oklahoma or the ore fields of Michigan."' 74
The article concluded that "there seem to be those in government who
believe you can do whatever you want to do, providing you make it legal." 71
It cannot be overstated the amount of political pressure that was
brought to bear upon the United States Department of Justice in reaction to
its decision to initiate the Santa Margarita Adjudication. The matter was
debated on the floor of Congress,"" and it was a major issue in the hearings
on the nomination of A. Devitt Vanech-Mr. Veeder's supervisor-to be
Deputy Attorney General of the United States.'77 Most importantly, it was an
issue that arose several times in the hearings on S. 18. Representative
Samuel W. Yorty (D-Cal.) made a point of appearing in support of S. 18:
I would very much like to see S. 18 enacted into law. I do not know,
particularly where the Government is acting ... [in] areas where only private
rights were previously involved, the fact that the Government comes in and
mentioned and the ownership of them by the United States." Hearings, supra note 14, at 40
(statement of Rep. Yorty) (emphasis added). The term "paramount" was very troubling to
California residents because that term had also been used by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. California 332 U.S. 19 (1947), in determining the United States has
"paramount rights" to three-mile wide strip of submerged lands off the California Coast. Id. at
38-39. Californians, including the local United States Representative Samuel W. Yorty, were
concerned that, fresh off its win in the United States Supreme Court, the United States was
attempting to expand the Court's decision to water rights and other natural resources that had
traditionally remained under state control. Hearings, supra note 14, at 42 (statement of Rep.
Yorty). However, as clarified by Mr. Veeder:
when you sue a man, in a suit of this kind, you assert that your rights are superior and
predominant, and that is really what suggests this issue.
You will observe that in California decisions-and that is the source of the word
"paramount," as we use it-they . refer to a riparian right as a "paramount" or a
"predominant" right

In other words, there is no basis contended that the term "paramount" has anything
whatever to do with sovereignty.
Id. at 58 (statement of Mr. Veeder). As, Mr. Veeder clarified, the United States used the word
"paramount" "as a word of art in water law, and not as having anything to do with sovereignty,
we assert a paramount right because we are the owners of a riparian right." Id. at 59.
173 Ainsworth & Shipp, supra note 158, at 125.
174 Id; High, supranote 162, at 125.
175 High, supra note 162, at 125.
176 Eg, 97 CONG. REC. 12,947-48 (1951); 98 CONG. REC. 120-29 (1952).
177 Hearings, supra note 14, at 69-70 (statements of Sen. William F. Knowland (R-Cal.) and
Sen. Richard M. Nixon (R-Cal.)).
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precludes people from getting into court to establish what the Government
rights are .. . it seems to me that where they are acting in lieu of former private
owners, they should take the same disabilities as well as take the benefits.
These three controversies made up the backdrop leading up to the
hearings on the McCarran Amendment. Significantly, all of these cases
involved federal ownership of state law rights rather than the reserved water
rights of an Indian Tribe. The Quinn River case involved state law rights
subsequently purchased by the United States; the cases in Colorado involved
water rights acquired pursuant to state law as required by the Reclamation
Act; and, like at the Quinn River, the Santa Margarita adjudication was for
state water rights purchased by the United States. In these cases, the United
States used its sovereign immunity to 1) preclude state court administration
of a previously adjudicated decree; 2) refuse state court jurisdication to
adjudicate water rights the United States had acquired pursuant to state law;
and 3) force either the adjudication or reacjudication of previously
adjudicated state law rights in federal court. The United States' refusal to
join state court adjudication and administration proceedings forced state
courts onto the horns of a dilemma. These courts could either determine the
government was a necessary party as it did in the Quinn River watershed,
thereby precluding the continuation of the action, or move on without the
United States as it did in Colorado and risk that the federal government
would later argue that resjudicatadid not apply and force a readjudication
of rights already adjudicated by the state court. Each case acted to
effectively preclude the states' courts from enforcing state water laws
9
"[w]herever ... the United States appears in a. watershed,""' causing
considerable concern that federal ownership of state water rights was
80
threatening "the years of building the water laws of the Western States." It
was these types of controversies that were on the minds of the Senators as
they developed, debated, and ultimately passed the McCarran Amendment.
B. The HearingsBefore the Senate Subcommittee and Debate on the Floorof
the Senate
Senators McCarran of Nevada and Watkins of Utah were cosponsors of
S. 18.1'' As cosponsors, these Senators were instrumental in the development
and passage of the McCarran Amendment. The Supreme Court has said that,
when analyzing the legislative history of a statute, "[ilt is the sponsors that
we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.""' As such,
Senators McCarran's and Watkins's understanding of the bill is particularly
probative of the purpose and intent behind the McCarran Amendment.
Senator Watkins's statements come from three days of hearings on the bill in

181

Id. at 43-44 (statement of Rep. Yorty).
Hearings, supranote 14, at 22 (statement of Mr. Saunders).
S. REP. No. 82-755, at 5 (1951).
97 CONG. REc. 10,682 (1951).

182

Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).

178
179
180
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the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United
States.'1" Senator McCarran's statements came on the floor of the Senate
during debate of the bill.'*
1. The Hearingson the McCananAmendment Chairedby SenatorArthur V
Watkins
The members of the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the United States Senate included Senator McCarran, Senator Watkins,
and Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.).'" Senator Watkins was made
cosponsor of the McCarran Amendment by unanimous consent1 6 and was
overwhelmingly the person that lead the hearings and drove the questioning
of witnesses during the hearings on the bill.""
Senator Watkins understood state water law. He was a lawyer in his
home state of Utah and served as the director of the Provo River Water
Users Association.'* Part of his duties as director included the organization
of metropolitan water districts along the Wasatch front." He also worked to
develop the Deer Creek Reservoir Project, a component part of the Provo
River Reclamation Project.'
More importantly, Senator Watkins understood how to abolish Indian
treaty rights. As the Chairman of the Indian Subcommittee of the Interior
Committee, he was the primary architect of the federal government's
termination policy of the 1950s."' Undoubtedly, as Chairman of the Indian
Subcommittee, Senator Watkins understood that Congress is presumed to be
"fully aware of the means by which termination [of traditional Indian
immunities] could be effected."' Further, he would have understood that
congressional abrogation of Indian property rights will not be inferred but
must instead be "plain and unambiguous" or "clear and plain."' 3 This

183
184
185
186
187

See infr Part V.B.1.
See infraPart V.B.2.
Hearings,supra note 14.
97 CONG. REC. 10,682 (1951).
Hearings,supra note 14.

188 R. WARREN METCALF, TERMINATION'S LEGACY: THE DISCARDED INDIANS OF UTAH 26 (2002).
189 Id
190 Id

191 VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 62-69 (1988) (detailing Senator Watkins's
involvement with the federal government's termination policy).
192 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 393 (1976) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,
504 (1973)).
193 United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346, 353 (1941). This principle has
been reaffirmed repeatedly. See, eg, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526
U.S. 172, 202 (1999) ("Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its
intent to do so."); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986) ("What is essential is clear
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on one
hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty."); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
690 (1979) ("Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find
congressional abrogation of treaty rights. . .. "); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,
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requires the abrogation "be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from
94
the surrounding circumstances and legislative history."' Given this, it is fair
to expect at least "some mention" of Indian Tribes in the hearings on S. 18 if
Senator Watkins intended for "such a sweeping change in the status of tribal
government and reservation Indians" to take place.'
Just the opposite, the little discussion that did occur suggests the
Senator intended the McCarran Amendment to have no impact on Indian
water rights. The sole discussion regarding Indian tribes came in a dialogue
96
regarding the Boulder Canyon Project Act' and Arizona's attempts to have

"

the United States Supreme Court apportion the water of the Colorado
River.' Mr. Veeder argued that "[the Boulder Canyon Act] specifically
provides that the largest user on the Colorado, the largest claimant on the
Colorado River, is exempt from it the Indian service, the Indian rights."
Earlier in the same proceeding Mr. Veeder highlighted "On Indian rights
alone, I think there are something like ... 1,000,000 acre-feet that they are
claiming for Indian rights down there .... I hope the proponents of this
legislation understand that this in our estimation has sufficient breadth to
authorize that litigation.""' Senator Watkins dismissed this, stating "[a]11
right. They have taken care of whatever the Indians have, and they act in a
trust capacity... for the Indians."' Mr. Veeder responded, "[b]ut the fact
remains that there is a million acre-feet of water the United States owns in
there. It doesn't matter how it owns it."o' In response, Senator Watkins
stated, "[y]es, it does. It makes quite a difference how it owns it. That is the
point. It owns it as trustee. The beneficiaries are the Indians and they have
2 2
prior right to the United States."
This comment is the key to the proper construction of the McCarran
Amendment. It exposes the confluence of the two themes that were
ubiquitous throughout the hearings. First, it clarifies that the Senator wanted
the applicability of the waiver to depend upon whether the United States
was claiming to have a "privilege of immunity that the original owner
wouldn't have.""0
Second, it reveals that the Senator viewed the applicability of the bill to
to situations where the United States acts "in a proprietary
limited
be
position."" He and other proponents of the bill repeatedly returned to the
theme that when the United States ceases to act as a sovereign and steps
391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968) ("[T]he intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly
imputed to the Congress.").
194 Bryan, 426 U.S. at 393 (quoting Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504-05).
195 Id at 373.
196 43 U.S.C. H§ 617-617v (2012).
197 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1962).
198 Hearings,supra note 14, at 13 (statement of Mr. Veeder).

199 Id. at 6.
Id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Watkins).
201 Id. (statement of Mr. Veeder).
202 Id. (statement of Sen. Watkins).
203 Id. at 8.

200

204

Id at 9.
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into the shoes of a private appropriator by acquiring state law water rights, it
should take the "disabilities as well as take the benefits" and acquire no
better rights than any other appropriator.205
An overwhelming majority of Senator Watkins's comments reveal that
the "policy underlying the McCarran Amendment"2 06 was to address the
issues that were occurring in places like the Quinn River in Nevada, the
Santa Margarita in California, and the adjudications in Colorado. In each of
these basins, the United States-cting in a proprietary manner-had
acquired state law rights, but was subsequently refusing the jurisdiction of
state courts to enforce those rights. Testifying on the Santa Margarita
controversy, Representative Yorty pointed out that "any rights the
Government has were acquired when they purchased the Santa Margarita
Rancho along about 1940.,207 His comments cut to the core of the purpose of
S. 18:
[W]hen [the United States] bought the Rancho Santa Margarita ... whatever
rights were pertinent to that ranch were based upon the private ownership, and
the rights acquired by the private owners.

... [Wihy should the purchase of it by the United States ... change the water
rights to the extent of making it paramount to everybody else on the stream?2 08
Senator Watkins applied this same logic to scenarios similar to the
Colorado experience where the United States had acquired water rights
directly from the state rather than by purchase or exchange. Senator
Watkins was frustrated that:

205 Id. at 44 (statement of Rep. Yorty); see also id
at 21 (statement of Mr. Saunders)
("[T]here is... a universal intent that the United States should have no special advantage or
preference when it acted in its proprietary capacity as an appropriator in the arid West, the
cloak of sovereign immunity .. . has prevented the fulfillment of this ideal."); id. at 49
(statement of Mr. Mathews) ("There can be no good reason why the water rights acquired by
the United States for the proprietary and economic use of its departments should acquire any
different status from water rights acquired by individuals.. . ."); id at 49 (statement of Merl B.
Peek, Assistant Secretary-Manager, Nat'l Reclamation Ass'n) ("The water users of the West are
aware that the special advantages or preferences accorded the United States in its acts of a
proprietary nature with respect to the appropriation of water. . . ."). One of the few places that
indicate a contrary view was a single comment where Senator Watkins asked Mr. Veeder.
"Suppose we amended the bill just to put the United States in the position that it waives its
rights in cases where it was in a proprietary situation or trust relationship [pursuant to the
Reclamation Act]." Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Watkins). However, based upon the entire body of
the legislative history, it seems the Senator ultimately concluded that an amendment was not
necessary because he did not view S. 18 to amount to a general waiver of sovereign immunity.
See id at 14.
206 San CarlosApache 7be, 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983) (quoting ColoradoRiver, 424
U.S. 800,
820 (1976)).
207 Hearings,supranote 14, at 38 (statement of Rep. Yorty).
208 Id. at 41.
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The State has permitted [the United States] to file, in accordance with State
law, applications to put this water to a beneficial use, and you are proceeding
year after year and paying the fees.... You go as far as you can, get all the
benefits out of the State law, and then when we get to this other point you can't

be brought in.209
Senator Watkins went on to point out, "in all States where you have the
doctrine of appropriation, you have State engineers and you file
applications, the Federal Government has followed through the Bureau of
Reclamation a uniform practice of filing the application just like any other
applicant." 2 10 Ultimately, this led to the rhetorical question "why shouldn't
the United States in those circumstances in that type of case be perfectly
willing to go into the State court just as it has gone in before the State
21
engineer and permit an adjudication?" 1

A separate but related issue was the interrelationship between the
proposed McCarran Amendment and the Reclamation Act. The record
repeatedly refers to the term "trustee," which is also a term of art when
referring to the relationship between the United States and Indian Tribes.
However, in this case, it seems that, as pointed out by Senator Watkins, the
term is referring to the relationship between the United States and
individuals benefitting from the Reclamation Act:
It acts as the trustee, for instance, on the Provo River. It makes filings with
the State engineer of Utah and buys water rights for the use of the Provo River
project .... That is not actually in a sovereign sense. It is doing that in the
capacity of trustee. If the beneficiary there were the actual owner, if you
but
transferred them over, the beneficiary could be taken in and made a party, 212
the United States, standing in trust for these beneficiaries, can't be taken in.

Senator Watkins highlights that the critical inquiry is 1) whether the
United States is acting in a proprietary or sovereign capacity, and 2) whether
the underlying beneficiary would have sovereign immunity in their own
21
right. 3

The National Reclamation Association took the same view. Speaking on
their behalf, Glenn Saunders argued:
[T]here is a large body of law demonstrating a universal intent that the United
States should have no special advantage or preference when it acted in its
proprietarycapacityas an appropriator ... the cloak of sovereign immunity ...
has prevented the fulfillment of this ideal. S. 18 is a step in the direction of
completing the requirement that the United States shall act as any other
209

Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Watkins).

210 Id. at 11.

211 Id. (emphasis added). Senator Watkins returned to this questions several times
throughout the hearings, earlier asking "[i]f you are going in the State and file applications and
take advantage of State laws and whatever benefits come from it, then why shouldn't you go
into State courts for adjudication?" Id. at 7.
212 [d at9.
213 Id
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appropriator . . with respect to the limitations imposed by the appropriation
system of water law which prevails in the arid West.2 14
The National Reclamation Association was a primary proponent of the
McCarran Amendment because its members wanted "legislation be urged to
strengthen the basic concept of section 8 [of the Reclamation Act] to require
that the administration and distribution of such appropiatedwaters shall at
all times be under the control, direction, and supervision of the established
water officials and courts of the State."2 1 5 Accordingly, the National
Reclamation Association urged Congress to, through a resolution, to pass a
law:

.

That . . the Congress of the United States [give consent that] the United
States may sue or be sued in all suits necessary for the protection of the
interests of the United States in water appropriation matters in the State courts
of the State where such waters are appropriated and/or beneficially used . .
Importantly, section 8, and the Reclamation Act as a whole, has nothing
to do with reserved water rights. Further, the terms "appropriation" and
"beneficially used," both terms of art for the state law based prior
appropriation doctrine, indicates the National Reclamation Association was
referring to only water rights acquired under state law. It further clarified
that its concern was that the United States had been purchasing state law
rights and then refusing to go into state court to defend them. From its point
of view:
[W]herever the United States becomes the proprietor of a water right in the
western United States, all of the supposedly settled water rights are subject to
review and reexamination in a court of the United States even though the
validity of all the water rights in the area may have been theretofore fully
determined by action of a State court. Such an upheaval may occur at any time
that the United States appears in a watershed, either as an appropriator or as a
purchaser of a water right, under the present state of the law.217
Speaking on behalf of the National Reclamation Association, Glenn
Saunders argued that "[t]he only possible way that we can hold the United
States to the observance of our[state]laws is to have them amenable to our
courts."218
Ultimately, Mr. Saunders argued that "[the] fundamental question here,
the one thing we have been discussing, is the question of whether the United
States, when it becomes an appropriator of water, should not follow through

214 Id at 21 (statement of Mr. Saunders) (emphasis added).
215 Id. (emphasis added); 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2012). By its very terms, reserved rights
are not
considered.
216 Hearings, supranote 14, at 21.
217 Id. at 22.
218 Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Recall that reserved rights are determined
pursuant to federal
rather than state law. See supraPartII.
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2
He went on to
all the way, just like any other private appropriator."
that
proposition
this fundamental
highlight that "[S.] 18 is slanted at ...
State
a
Western
in
when the United States becomes an appropriator of water
it shall take on exactly the same status and burden as any private
appropriator."22 0 He concluded that "we really believe is that the Federal
Government, when it becomes an appropriator or an owner of water on any
stream, should have to submit itself to exactly the same procedures as a
22
private appropriator in the matter of appropriation."
To drive this point home, the Association submitted a summary of
arguments:

(1) Water rights are rights of beneficial use and are vested property rights.
(2) Under Federal Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877, the United States irrevocably
and unconditionally surrendered its rights to the States to control the use of
waters of the streams in the West.
(3) The failure of the United States to submit to the jurisdiction of State
courts ... for the adjudication of appropriative rights ... leaves such State
administration over such streams incomplete; and, in fact, jeopardizes such
State administration.
For his part, Senator Watkins supported the Association's point of view:
There are some phases of Government activity in relation to water rights that
ought to be protected so that the United States would not be subject to waiver,
forfeiture, abandonment and what not. Maybe that ought to be taken care of,
direction that
but I have a strong feeling that we ought to have litigation in the 223
has been proposed by the [N]ational [Reclamation] [A]ssociation.
Senator Watkins ultimately concluded that S. 18 didn't constitute a general
waiver but instead was proposed to address a very specific and narrow
situation:
[I]f the United States is going to come in there and take advantage of the laws
and acquire water rights in trust for private individuals, private
corporations ... the people of Utah are vitally interested in seeing that the
United States goes the full distance, and not only claims all the assets that go
along but takes a few of the liabilities and subjects itself to the courts there and
has those rights determined. You are not being hurt in any other capacity.

219 Hearings,supra note 14, at 32.
220 Id. at 25.
221 Id at 3.
222 Id at 50 (statement of Mr. Peek). Importantly, the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 only apply
to "sources of water supply upon the publchands" Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat.
377, 377 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)). They are "not
applicable to . . reserved land and waters." Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448
(1955).
223 Hearings,supranote 14, at 35 (statement of Sen. Watkins).
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When you get into the field of becoming trustee for private individuals, then
you ought to be willing to submit to the same jurisdiction the individuals would
be if they owned the property and had the legal title as well as the equitable
title.2 4

This history indicates that the proponents of S. 18, particularly Senator
Watkins, sought to fix a problem that did not apply to the water rights of
Indian tribes. The confluence of the two primary themes of the hearings that
when the United States acts in a proprietary capacity and steps into the
shoes of a private appropriator it should not be able to claim a "privilege of
immunity that the original owner wouldn't have,225

are themes only

applicable to water rights acquired pursuant to state law. When the United
States reserves water rights on behalf of Indian tribes it is doing so in its
sovereign
capacity. 2 6 Furthermore,
Indian tribes,
unlike private
appropriators, enjoy sovereign immunity in their own right.227 As such, when
the inquiry is refocused on the reserved rights held in trust for the tribes the

United States would not "be given a privilege of immunity the original owner
wouldn't have."22 " Therefore, "[w]hen attention is shifted to those sources of
water rights that are not available to the private users [e.g. reserved
rights] ... the applicability of the statute becomes extremely doubtful."2 2 9
2. SenatorPatMcCarran's Statements on the Floorof the Senate
Senator McCarran was the original sponsor of the McCarran
Amendment.2 3o However, he is strikingly silent in the legislative history on
the bill. He did not participate in the subcommittee hearings."' In fact, his
only comments come in a letter to fellow Senator Warren G. Magnuson of
Washington State 2 2 and a brief debate on the floor of the Senate. However,
his comments on the floor of the Senate give a good outline regarding his
view of the scope of the McCarran Amendment:

224
225
226
227

Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Watkins).
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, silpr note 17, § 19.03[4]; see alsoDE VATTEL, supranote31 at 160.
See cases cited supranote 57.
228 Hearings, supra note 14, at 8 (statement of Sen. Watkins).
229 Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 110.
230 97 CONG. REC. 10,682 (1951).
231 Hearings, supranote 14.
232 Letter from Senator Pat McCarran to Senator Warren G. Magnuson (Aug. 25, 1951), in S.
REP. No. 82-755, at 9-10 (1951). Senator Magnuson was concerned the McCarran Amendment
could authorize "an individual or group, having water rights on [a] stream, bringing suit to
adjudicate their respective rights-thereby preventing the Bureau of Reclamation from going
ahead with the Hells Canyon Project while litigation is in process or pending." Letter from
Senator Warren G. Magnuson to Senator Pat McCarran (Aug. 24, 1951), in S. REP. No. 82-755, at
9. In response, Senator McCarran made clear that "S. 18 is not intended to be used for the
purpose of obstructing the project of which you speak or any similar project and it is not
intended to be used for any other purpose than to allow the United States to be joined in a suit
where it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners on a given stream." Letter
from Senator Pat McCarran to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, supra note 232, at 9-10.
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Mr. President, the purpose of the proposed legislation is to permit the United
States of America to be joined as a defendant in any suit for the adjudication of
rights to the use of water from any water source, or for the administration of
such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner, or is in the
process of acquiring ownership of rights by appropriation under State law, and
where there is a showing that the United States is a necessary party to such
adjudication.2 3

Senator McCarran also laid out the policy issue the McCarran
Amendment intended to address:
The State of New Mexico, the State of Nevada, the State of Idaho, the State of
California-in fact, all the western arid and semi-arid States-are interested in
the bill, because the Government of the United States, during the past 15 or 18
years, has acquired on the various natural streams of the West, holdings in real
estate which was formerly taken up by private citizens and in connection with
which they, as private citizens, diverted water from the natural streams and
applied it to the land.2 34
From his view, this had created a jurisdictional vacuum in the West
whereby the United States was stepping into the shoes of private
appropriators by acquiring state law water rights but refusing be joined to
state court proceedings for the determination and/or administration of those

rights.
The necessity that all owners or claimants of water rights on a given stream
be joined in a suit for the adjudication of water rights is conceded....
Particularly in view of the fact that the United States has acquired its water
rights from former owners who were subject to such suits, the committee is of
the opinion that to allow the United States in its own right or as trustee to have
a better right than the former owner is not fair and just to the other water users
on the stream.2 35
Importantly, Indian tribes came up during debate on the McCarran
Amendment on the floor of the Senate. However, they did not come up in the
context of whether their water rights were within the scope of the
Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity. Instead, Senator Dennis

Chdvez (D-N.M.) was asldng about a portion of the bill that would later be
removed that required the Department of the Interior to inventory all water
23 6
Senator Chivez wanted to know
rights claimed by the United States.
23 7
whether "Indian rights will also be integrated [into that inventory]?"
Senator McCarran replied with an unequivocal "No. All that the bill provides

233 97 CONG. REC. 12,947 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
234 Id. at 12,948.
235

Id
236 Id. (statement of Sen. Dennis ChAvez).
237 Id
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is that the Interior Department shall be a repository of the rights that have
been acquired and are held by the United States.""" However, Senator
Chavez went on to ask "[d]oes the Government claim those rights as the
Government, or could it act as trustee, let us say, for a tribe of Indians?"2 "9

Senator McCarran replied that "[iut could act as a trustee, I suppose. But, Mr.
President, there is a deeper and more far-reaching purpose [to the
inventory]." 2
Unfortunately, the debate ended at this point without Senator McCarran
explaining his view on this important point. Although it does not directly
address the question of sovereign immunity, it does expose the Senator's
state of mind vis-A-vis the interrelationship between the bill and Indian
tribes. It clearly shows that Senator McCarran had not considered and did
not believe the bill would include tribal water rights. As the Supreme Court
has repeatedly found, "[tihe silence of the sponsors of amendments is
pregnant with significance."
Additionally, his statement regarding the United States "act[ing] as a
trustee" should be viewed through the lens of Nevada's experience during
the Quinn River Adjudication.
In that case, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had
purchased land for the benefit of the Fort McDermitt Northern Paiute and
Western Shoshone Tribes.2 43 Along with that land, the Bureau acquired a
number of state-issued water rights. " The Bureau refused to be joined to a
state court adjudication to have those state-issued rights administered. In
this unique instance, the government was acting as trustee for the Tribes but
the water rights in question were not reserved rights. Instead, the Bureau
had acquired state rights that would have otherwise been subject to state
court jurisdiction.2" Although it cannot be definitively said that this is the
scenario Senator McCarran had in mind when making his comments on the
floor of the Senate, it is consistent with the general policy he espoused that
where "the United States has acquired its water rights from former owners
who were subject to such suits" it was not "fair and just" to other water
users "to allow the United States in its own right or as trustee to have a
better right than the former owner."2
40

241

2

46

238

Id (statement of Sen. McCarran) (emphasis added).

239 Id (statement of Sen. Dennis Chivez).
240 Id. (statement of Sen. McCarran).
241 Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd. v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 706,
377

U.S. 58, 66 (1964).
242 97 CONG. REC. 12,948 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran); see also supra Part V.A.1
(discussing the Quinn River Adjudication).
243 Act of Jan. 17, 1936, ch. 7, 49 Stat. 1094.
244 Hearings, supranote 14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews).
245 Id at 47-48.
246 97 CONG. REC. 12,948 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
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The official Senate Report on the McCarran Amendment begins with a
somewhat unhelpful statement regarding the official purpose of the
McCarran Amendment:
The purpose of the proposed legislation, as amended, is to permit the joinder
of the United States as a party defendant in any suit for the adjudication of
rights to the use of water of a river system or other source or for the
administration of such rights where it appears that the United States is the
owner or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under
State law, by purchase, exchange, or otherwise and that the United States is a
necessary party to such

suit.

The statement of purpose is no more than a restatement of the language
of the McCarran Amendment itself. As such, little information can be
gleaned as to Congress's intent. However, the Report goes on to explain that
"in order to understand the background of this legislation a r6sum6 of some
of the history and decisions relating to the law of water rights would be of
help."248 Importantly, the history and decisions the Report refers to address
only the congressional deference to state law water rights on the public.
domain:
In 1877 the Congress, in the Desert Land Act of 1877, severed the water from
the land, and the effect of such statute was thereafter that the land should be
patented by the United States separate and apart from the water and that all
nonnavigable water should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws
of the States and Territories named in the act. 249
The Report goes on to clarify "Congress was most careful not to upset,
in any way, the irrigation and water laws of the Western States." 2 50 "It is
therefore settled that in the arid Western States the law of appropriation is

247 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 2 (1951).
248

Id

249 Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted). The only place where Indians are specifically

mentioned in the Senate Report comes on page four, wherein the drafters noted that
the [Supreme] Court said in a marginal note on page 164 of the opinion:
In this connection it is not without significance that Congress since the passage of the
Desert Land Act, has repeatedly recognized the supremacy of State law in respect to the
acquisition of water for the reclamation of public lands of the United States and lands of
its Indian wards.
Id. at 4 (quoting Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 (1935)).
However, the language of the statement clearly refers to water rights "acquire[d]" rather than
"reserved." Further, it specifically limits the statement to water acquired under the reclamation
laws, which expressly require the United States to acquire water rights under state law.
Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2012).
250 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 3 (1951).
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the law governing the right to acquire, use, administer, and protect the
public waters as provided in each such State.""'
According to the Senate Report, a primary basis for the McCarran
Amendment is the Desert Land Act and Congress's deference to state water
law."' However, Congress knew at the time the Report was published that
the Desert Land Act expressly concerned only "sources of water supply
upon the public lands."253 Further, Congress understood the "familiar
principle of public land law that statutes providing generally for disposal of
the public domain are inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly
subject to sale and disposition because they have been appropriated to some
other purpose."" Simply put, Congress understood that its deference to
state water law did not apply to federal reservations of water."
Further, the Senate Report expressly limited its scope to "acquired"
water rights.1 This language clarifies that the reach of the McCarran
Amendment was intended to be limited to state law water rights because,
even at the time of the McCarran Amendment's consideration in Congress, it
was well settled that the United States does not typically acquire water
rights on behalf of Indian Tribes. Rather, Indian Tribes impliedly reserve
their rights pursuant to the operative documents that created each Indian
reservation.'
It is worth remembering that "the report of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary on [S. 181 is based largely upon" a statement to the Senate
drafted by W.T. Mathews, Attorney General for the State of Nevada.5 As
such, the Senate Report, and indeed, the intent of the Congress in passing
the McCarran Amendment, should be considered from the perspective of the
-experience of western states in places like the Quinn River in Nevada.
Through this lens, the portion of the Senate Report quoted by the Supreme
Court in ColoradoRiver comes into clearer view. That portion of the Senate
Report, which is copied directly out of Mr. Mathew's statement, reads: "[iun
the administration and the adjudication of water rights under State laws...
all water users on a stream, in practically every case, are interested and
necessary parties to any court proceedings."2 5 9 The actual text of Mr.
Mathew's statement clarifies that the Quinn River controversy was "[a] most
concrete example" of the type of problem the McCarran Amendment was

251 Id. at 4.
252 Id
253 Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107,

§ 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.

§ 321 (2012)).
254 United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 510 (1938); see also Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100,
109 (1905); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114, 119 (1894); Wilcox v. Jackson ex
dem. McConnel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 499 (1839).
255 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
256 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 2, 4-6 (1951).
257 See supm Part II.
258 Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 104.
259 Compare S. REP. No. 82-755, at 4-5 (1951) (emphasis added), with Hearings, supra note
14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews).
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intended to resolve.260 That controversy arose after the United States
purchased previously decreed state law water rights but refused to enter
state court for the administration of those rights."' Because the United
States was "a most necessary party ... due to the interlocking nature of the
adjudicated rights," the United States' refusal to join the administration
proceedings precluded the state court's ability to enforce the decree and, as
of the date of Mr. Mathews' statement, the "the action ha[d] not proceeded
further."2 62
. It would seem that the McCarran Amendment was designed to address
the inequity caused by the federal claim of immunity in situations like the
Quinn River controversy. The problem was that "[t]he United States has
acquired many lands and water rights in States that have the doctrine of
prior appropriation," and:
It is apparent that if any water user claiming to hold such right by reason of
ownership thereof by the United States or any of its departments is permitted
to claim immunity from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such claims could
materially interfere with the lawful and equitable use of water for beneficial
use by the other water users who are amenable to and bound by the decrees
and orders of the State courts.2

2

The Report went on to highlight that:
If a water user [the United States,] possessing a decreed water right is immune
from suits and proceedings in the courts for enforcement of valid decrees, then
the years of building the water laws of the Western States in the earnest
endeavor of their proponents to effect honest, fair and equitable division of the
264
public waters will be seriously jeopardized.
Ultimately, the Senate concluded that "[w]hen these lands and water
rights were acquired from the individuals the Government obtained no
better rights than had the persons from whom the rights were obtained." 1
This suggests that the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity was
intended to be limited to those situations where the United States was
stepping into the shoes of private appropriators, because in those instances
"there is no valid reason why the United States should not be required to join
in a proceeding when it is a necessary party and to be required to abide by
the decisions of the Court in the same manner as if it were a private
individual."266
The Report concluded that "Congress has not removed the bar of
immunity even in its own courts in suits wherein water rights acquiredunder
260 Hearings,supra note 14, at 47 (statement of Mr. Mathews).
261 See supra Part V.A. 1.

262 Hearings,supra note 14, at 47-48 (statement of Mr. Mathews).
263

S. REP. No. 82-755, at 5 (1951).

264

Id

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
266 Id. at 6.
265
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State law are drawn in question. The bill (S. 18) was introduced for the very
purpose of correcting this situation and the evils growing out of such
immunity."267

D. The Interpretationof the DepartmentsofJustice and the Interior
The Supreme Court in Colorado River stated the "legislative history
demonstrates that ...
[i]t was unmistakably the understanding of
proponents and opponents of the legislation that it comprehended water
rights reserved for Indians."M However, the Court's analysis of the legislative
history was limited to a single statement from the Senate report and that:
In the Senate hearings on the Amendment, participants for the Department of
Justice and the Department of the Interior made clear that the proposal would
include water rights reserved on behalf of Indians. In addition, the Senate
report on the amendment took note of a recommendation in a Department of
the Interior report that no consent to suit be given as to Indian rights and
rejected the recommendation.26
Far from both the "proponents and opponents," the only entity that
actually discussed the impact the McCarran Amendment may have on Indian
water rights in any detail was the executive branch, which very clearly
sought the defeat of the bill. The letter cited by the Supreme Court from
Mastin G. White, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior,270 is one of the
only places in the legislative history where Indian reserved water rights were
specifically mentioned:
The interests of the United States in the use of the waters of its river systems
are so many and so varied. . . It is enough, I hope, for present purposes to
exemplify these interests by pointing to those which it has under the
commerce clauses of the Constitution; those which exist by virtue of the
creation of Indian reservations under the doctrine of United States v. Winters
or by virtue of the creation of, for instance, a national park; those which it has
asserted by entering into international treaties; those which it may have by
virtue of its present and prior ownership of the public domain . . and those
which it has acquired by purchase, gift, or condemnation from private
owners. 271
The Department of the Interior was concerned that "[s]ince the United
States can be said, with varying degrees of accuracy, to be the 'owner' of
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
268 ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976).
269 Id. at 810-12.
267

270 Id. at 812 n.18 (citing Letter from Peyton Ford, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Senator Pat McCarran (Aug. 3, 1951), in Hearings, supra note 14, at 66-67, and Letter
from Mastin G. White, Acting Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Senator Pat McCarran
(Aug. 3, 1951), in Hearings,supranote 14, at 67-68).
271 Letter from Mastin G. White to Senator Pat McCarran, supra note 270, at 67 (citations
omitted).
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rights of any or all of these types, it is clear to me that enactment of the bill
could lead to a tremendous volume of unwarranted litigation."2 72
Mr. White went on to suggest an alternative approach:
[I]t seems to me to be proper for the United States to permit itself to be joined
as a party ... wherever(1) in the course of a [state court] general adjudication . . it is made to
appear ... that the United States is a claimant of such right and is a necessary
party to the proceeding; that the right is claimed for the direct benefit of
persons who, if they were themselves the claimants, would be subject to the
laws of that State with respect to the appropriation, use, or distribution of
water; and that the right claimed by the United States exists solely by virtue of
the laws of the State and is required, by a statute of the United States, to be
established by an officer or employee thereof in accordance with said laws or
has been or is being acquired by the United States from a predecessor in
interest whose right depends upon its having been so established ....

The qualifications spoken of above which should, I believe, be attached to
such a waiver of immunity are these: (a) The waiver should in all instances be
limited to an adjudication of those rights of the United States which depend
solely upon their having been acquired pursuant to State law and should not
extend to those that exist independently of such law or to those which have
not
existed for a state number of years (say, 6 years); . . (e) the waiver should
273
extend to rights asserted by the United States for or on behalf of Indians.
Mr. White's comments expose a tension between the intent of the
Congress in developing the McCarran Amendment and the executive
branch's interpretation of the bill's scope. As the Supreme Court correctly
points out,7 4 Mr. Veeder, the Department of Justice's representative at the

hearings on S. 18, predicted that:
If we were sued we would have to prove our reclamation rights, our Indian
rights, the Department of Defense rights ....

Where the United States is a party the United States of necessity must come
in and bring in, for instance its forest service rights, its soil conservation rights,
its Indian rights, and when that occurs you must have everyone in there or the
decree will not be effective .27

272

Id

273 Id. at 67-68.
274 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 811-12 (citing Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Mr.

Veeder)).
275

Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Mr. Veeder).
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Although Mr. Veeder's statement would prove prophetic, the record
demonstrates the senators did not agree with his assessment of the
McCarran Amendment's scope. The Supreme Court has "cautioned against
the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its
legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat the bill, they understandably
tend to overstate its reach."" Instead, "[i]t is the sponsors that we look to
when the meaning of the statutory words are in doubt."27 7 The legislative
history demonstrates that the actual sponsors of S. 18 believed its scope was
already limited to water rights acquired by the United States pursuant to
state law where the United States was seeking to "be given the privilege of
immunity that the original owner wouldn't have." 2 78
Mary Wallace has pointed out that Congress's reaction to Interior's
letter
can be construed in at least two ways. One, the letter served as notice to
Congress that the statute could be construed to include reserved rights and
Indian water rights. Thus, by not acting to limit waiver, Congress intended that
these rights be included. Two, Congress thought the bill already expressed the
narrow waiver proposed by the secretary and there was no need to change the
language.
Based upon the entire body of legislative history, it seems the latter
interpretation more accurately reflects Congress's understanding that the
scope of the McCarran Amendment was to be very narrowly tailored to
address the specific problem that "[t]he United States Government has
acquired many lands and water rights in States that have the doctrine of
prior appropriation. When these lands and water rights were acquiredfrom
the individuals the Government obtained no better rights than had the
person from whom the rights were obtained.",2 8 In other words, the
legislative history indicates that since Congress's understanding was that the
McCarran Amendment did exactly what the Department of the Interior was
suggesting, no changes were needed to the language.

276 Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. V. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 706, 377
U.S. 58, 66 (1964).
277 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
278 Hearings, supra note 14, at 8 (statement of Sen. Watkins).
279 Wallace, supra note 1, at 211.
280 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 5-6 (1951) (emphasis added).
281 Further, as pointed out by Professor Abrams, "Congress justifiably could have thought
Indian rights exempt under principles of Indian law." Abrams, supra note 7, at 1118. "States
have no power to regulate Indian affairs except that which is specifically granted by Congress".
Id at 1118 n.51. Professor Abrams goes on to point out that "subsequent acts of Congress
indicate hostility to state jurisdiction over Indian rights." Id. at 1118. For this proposition, he
cites the Senate report of 28 U.S.C. § 1362, which "vests original jurisdiction in the federal
courts for certain types of suits brought by Indian tribes." Abrams, supra note 7, at 1118 n. 52
(citing S. REP. No. 89-1507 (1966)). Abrams writes that the Senate found that "one reason for the
act is the Indians' fear that state courts resolve their suits unfavorably." Id. (citing S. REP. No.
89-1507, at 2). "The report also credits the federal courts with 'more expertise in deciding
questions involving treaties with the Federal Government as well as interpreting the relevant
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VI. REVISITING THE LANGUAGE OF THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT

Through the lens of the legislative history, the language of the
McCarran Amendment comes into sharper focus. The relevant portion of the
McCarran Amendment reads:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the
United States is a necessary party to such suit.2

It was the "or otherwise" language that was seized upon by the Supreme
Court when it determined that the McCarran Amendment included reserved
rights held for the benefit of Indian tribes.* However, the intersection of
basic statutory construction, the special rules of construction that apply
specifically to Indian tribes, and the legislative history of the McCarran
Amendment suggests a different result.
In finding the "or otherwise" element included Indian reserved water
rights, the Court failed to apply "the principle of ejusdem generisthat would
have required the court to conclude the 'or otherwise' provision does not
encompass the adjudication of water right having a source in the powers
2
M Eusdem geneis applies "when
over navigation and over reserved lands.""
specific words are followed by a general term such as 'or otherwise' and
works to limit the objects encompassed by the general term to the same
class as those specifically enumerated."2 8 The question, therefore, is whether
"water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange"
form a specific class and, if so, whether reserved water rights would fit into
that class.2 6

body of Federal law that has developed over the years."' Id. He also points to the Act of Aug. 15,
1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)), "which
further proves congressional hostility to state jurisdiction, since it granted certain states
jurisdiction over disputes involving Indians if the states had jurisdiction over similar suits not
involving Indians, but specifically prohibited state jurisdiction over Indian water rights."
Abrams, supra note 7, at 1118 n. 52.
282 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012).
283 ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1976).
284 Wallace, supra note 1, at 211. It would perhaps be more accurate to suggest that the
Court first rejected the application of ejusdem geneis in Eagle County based upon its
conclusion that the rights listed in section (a)(2) of the McCarran Amendment did not qualify
section (a)(1) and then subsequently failed to apply the doctrine in Colorado River despite
switching course and finding that "the Court [in Eagle Countyj held that reserved rights were
included in those rights where the United States was 'otherwise' the owner." ColoradoRiver 424

U.S. at 810; see also supra Part IV (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
McCarran Amendment).
285 Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 110; see also NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (7th ed. 2015).
286 Dilworth & Kirgis, supra note 81, at 110 (citations omitted).
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First, as pointed out by Dilworth and Kirgis, "[t]he specific terms in the
first sentence of the McCarran Amendment ... would seem to form a
class."287 Each of the water rights listed are, by definition, water rights
acquired under state law. The term "appropriate" in the water law context is
derived from the prior appropriation doctrine, the primary state law water
rights doctrine in the west. Moreover, although state law water rights are
routinely purchased or exchanged, the Nonintercourse Acte" significantly
limits the ability to purchase or permanently exchange reserved water
rights.8 Indeed, as the Supreme Court highlighted in Eagle County, the
Amendment "covers rights acquired by appropriation under state law and
rights acquired 'by purchase' or 'by exchange,' which we assume would
normally be appropriative rights."290

Second, it is doubtful that reserved rights would fit into the class
enumerated in the McCarran Amendment. Indeed, the United States does
not acquire, appropriate, purchase, or exchange federal reserved water
rights. Rather, federal reserved water rights are "reserved" by the United
287 Id. at 111. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is "inapplicable if the specific enumerations
do not all fit into one definable class." Id. at 110. They go on to highlight that the doctrine is also
inapplicable where "the specific terms exhaust the class or if the statute shows an intent that
the general term be not limited to the class." Id. at 110-11. Neither of these are applicable to the
McCarran Amendment. First, there is no language in the McCarran Amendment that would
show an intent that the general term be expanded beyond the class of water rights specifically
enumerated. Second, as Dilworth and Kirgis point out, the specific terms enumerated do not
exhaust the class "since the acquisition of water rights through ownership of riparian lands is
not enumerated," and, as a result, it "would seem to be at least one further method of acquiring
water rights available to the public." Id. at 111. The widespread presence of the Santa Margarita
River controversy in the legislative history provides evidence that Congress intended the "or
otherwise" language to apply to riparian rights rather than reserved rights. See supra Part VA.3.
California is a dual prior appropriation-riparian water rights state. TARLOCK, supra note 22,
§ 5:11. However, most western states have abolished the riparian doctrine. Since Congress
believed that the McCarran Amendment's applicability "would in most instances be confined to
those states in which the doctrine of prior appropriation is applicable," it could be that
Congress wanted to ensure that the McCarran Amendment would apply to riparian rights but,
recognizing its limited applicability in the west, chose to include it in the more general "or
otherwise" term. S. REP. No. 82-755, at 2 (1951).
288 Act of June 30, 1834 (Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834), ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730-31
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)).
289 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, §19.03[7][c] n.150 ("As a general proposition, the
word 'land' in statutes of this type has been construed in include appurtenant waters."); Richard
B. Collins, The Fbture Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 481, 489 (1985)
("Water rights are real property subject to the general restraint against alienation of tribal
land."). Notwithstanding the significant limitations on permanently alienating reserved water
rights, there is ample precedent to support the long-term but nonpermanent leasing of reserved
water rights, particularly Indian reserved water rights. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17,
§19.03[7][a]-[b]. Another narrow exception to the general rule that reserved water rights may
not be permanently alienated exists for so called Walton rights. See Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that since an allottee is entitled to a
pro ratashare of the Tribe's irrigation water right, a subsequent non-Indian purchaser is entitled
to a water right for the amount of water being used by the allottee plus any water the nonIndian puts to use within a reasonable amount of time after acquiring the property, up to the
allotment's prorata entitlement).
290 Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).
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States when it removes land from the public domain."' Importantly, although
the United States is able to acquire water rights pursuant to state law, the
292
public at large is not able to reserve water rights under federal law.
Accordingly, "[e]ach of [the class] describes a method of acquisition
available to the public at large as well as the Government. They give no
inkling of intent to include governmental sources of water such as the
2 93
navigation servitude or the power over reserved lands."

'

This argument becomes substantially more forceful when coupled with
the Indian law canons of construction. 1' Although not applicable in Eagle
29
County, these "eminently sound and vital canon[s]" 5 of interpretation
should have taken center stage in ColoradoRiverwhen the Court considered
the issue of whether the McCarran Amendment included Indian reserved
water rights. The canons require statutes affecting Indian tribes "be liberally
construed [with] doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the
Indians."29 6 Put another way, the canons require that "statutes are to be read
to reserve Congress' powers [to abrogate tribal rights] in the absence of a
9
clear expression by Congress to the contrary."' Through this lens, the "or
otherwise" language in the McCarran Amendment cannot be said to be a
"clear expression by Congress" to abrogate tribal sovereignty over its water
rights. At best, this language is ambiguous and its application to Indian water
rights is doubtful.
This analysis of basic statutory construction, as well as the Indian
canons of construction, is consistent with the legislative history of the
McCarran Amendment. The events that precipitated the introduction of the
McCarran Amendment involved only state law water rights that the United
States had appropriated" or purchased."' Likewise, the hearings, debates,
and the Senate Report on S. 18 all focused almost entirely on state law water
0
rights that had been purchased.oo or appropriated consistent with state law.
In each case, the United States' ownership, along with its claims of sovereign
immunity, acted to preclude state court jurisdiction over state water law
"[wiherever .. . the United States appears in a watershed," subjecting "all the
supposedly settled water rights .. . to review and reexamination in a court of
the United States."302 Proponents of the bill feared that this would eventually

291 Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
577 (1908).
292 Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935).
293 See Dilworth & Kirgis, supr note 81, at 111.
294 See cases cited supra note 89.
295 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast,
425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976)).
296 Id. (quoting Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)); see also cases

cited supranote 89.
297 N Cheyenne 7ibe, 425 U.S. at 656.
298 See supra Part V.A.2.
299 See supra Part V.A, .3.
300 E.g, Hearings,supra note 14, at 8 (statement of Mr. Veeder).
301 Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Watkins).
302 Id. at 22 (statement of Mr. Saunders).
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lead to nullification of "the years of building the water laws of the Western
States."303
In contrast to state law water rights, the reserved rights of the tribes
were "virtual[ly] absen[t]" from the legislative history on the McCarran
Amendment.0' As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]his omission has
significance in the application of the canons of construction ... as some
mention would normally be expected if such a sweeping change in the status
of tribal government
and reservation Indians had been contemplated by
3 05
Congress.
Just the opposite, Senator Watkins stated unequivocally "[y]ou don't
have a general waiver in this""" and, in fact, the few places where the
Senators did discuss Indian reserved water rights indicate they did not
intend for them to be included within the scope of the bill. In response to the
statement by the representative of the Department of Justice that S. 18
would include Indian water rights and that "[i]t doesn't matter how [the
United States] owns [the water right]."0o Senator Watkins responded by
stating, "[y]es, it does. It makes quite a difference how it owns it. That is the
point. It owns it as trustee. The beneficiaries are the Indians and they have
30
prior right to the United States."a

Senator Watkins also noted that the bill aimed to eliminate "the
privilege of immunity that the original owner wouldn't have."' These two
statements read together are the key to a proper construction of the
McCarran Amendment. The bill was aimed at water rights the United States
can acquire when acting in its proprietary capacity similar to any other
individual seeking a water right rather than its sovereign capacity, as it
would when reserving land and water rights for some governmental
purpose.3 0 In the case of Indian tribes, the United States owns Indian
reserved rights in trust for the tribes in its sovereign capacity and the tribes
have sovereign immunity in their own right.3 '" Therefore, in the circumstance
where the reserved rights of Indian tribes are involved, the United States
would not have a privilege of immunity that the beneficial owners would not
otherwise have. Accordingly, "[wlhen attention is shifted" to reserved rights
held for the benefit of Indian tribes, "the applicability of the statute becomes
extremely doubtful." 1 2

303 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 5 (1951).
304 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976).
305

Id

306 Hearings,supra note 14, at 14 (statement of Sen. Watkins).

307 Id. at 13 (statement of Mr. Veeder)
308 Id. (statement of Sen. Watkins).

309 Id at S.
310 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 17, §19.03[4].
311 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) See cases
cited supra note 57

(discussing the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes).
312 Dilworth & Kirgis, supranote 81, at 110.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decisions in Eagle County, Colorado River, and
San Carlos Apache Tibe have had dramatic and detrimental consequences
in Indian country. By allowing state courts to determine reserved water
rights, the Court has moved away from the "deeply rooted" federal policy of
3
leaving Indian tribes free from state court jurisdiction. This has proven
problematic because Indian tribes often have senior but unused water rights,
and state courts are "ill-equipped to deal with the political pressures arrayed
against tribal efforts to reclaim water that ha[s] been used by the non-Indian
community."' As a result, tribes are now forced into "hostile" state court
forums for the determination of their water rights "in which [they] must be
315
prepared to compromise their claims."
The Court's decision that the "or otherwige" language in the McCarran
Amendment includes reserved water rights was ultimately driven by its
conclusion that "[tihe clear federal policy evinced by [the McCarran
Amendment] is the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a
river system."' However, the legislative history indicates a different policy.
One that was designed to address a narrow but unfair and politically
untenable situation that was occurring throughout the west at the time: the
United States was acquiring state law water rights and subsequently refusing
to be joined to state court proceedings seeking to either adjudicate or
administer those rights. Little in the legislative history of the McCarran
Amendment indicates Congress intended to deviate from its deeply rooted
policy of "leaving the Indians free from state jurisdiction.""
The legislative history is packed with events leading up to the
introduction of the McCarran Amendment that exemplify the problem the
McCarran Amendment seems to have been designed to fix. The United
States was purchasing state law rights in places like the Quinn River in
Nevada and the Santa Margarita River in California. Similarly, the
government was appropriating water rights pursuant to state law consistent
with the Reclamation Act throughout the west. Every instance discussed in
the available legislative history involved the United States' acquisition of
water rights pursuant to state law. The acquisition of these state law water
rights by the United States was compromising the states' ability to manage
water within their borders because federal claims of sovereign immunity
was effectively precluding state court enforcement of state water laws. As a
result, water users in the West were becoming increasingly alarmed that "the
long years of travail through which the water laws of our Western States
have pased [sic] ... have been in vain."""

313
314
315
316
317
318

Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S.786, 789 (1945).
McElroy & Davis, supranote 7, at 599-600.
Blumm et al., The Mirage oflndian Reserved WaterRights, supranote 7, at 1161.
ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. 810, 823 (1976).
Rice, 324 U.S. at 789.
Hearngs, supranote 14, at 48 (statement of Mr. Mathews).
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Perhaps most illuminating are the statements of Senators McCarran and
Watkins, cosponsors of the McCarran Amendment. Although the executive
branch, through the Departments of Justice and the Interior, prophesized the
McCarran Amendment could be interpreted as a general waiver, including
the rights of Indian tribes, there is little evidence in the legislative history
that indicates the Senators shared their view. The only statements made by
the Senators regarding Indians signals they did not view the McCarran
Amendment to include Indian reserved water rights.
Instead, the problem, according to Senator McCarran, was that
during the past 15 or 18 years, [the United States] has acquired on the various
natural streams of the West holdings, in real estate which was formerly taken
up by private citizens and in connection with which they, as private citizens,
diverted water from the natural streams and applied it to the land."'
The McCarran Amendment was passed into law to address these water
rights. Senator Watkins argued that
if the United States is going to come in there and take advantage of the laws
and acquire water rights in trust for private individuals, private
corporations ... [it should go] the full distance, and not only claim[] all the

assets that go along but takes a few of the liabilities and subject[] itself to the
courts there and ha[ve] those rights determined.. . . When you get into the field
of becoming trustee for private individuals, then you ought to be willing to
submit to the same jurisdiction the individuals would be if they owned the
property and had the legal title as well as the equitable title."'

The confluence of the basic rules of statutory construction, the canons
of construction applied to Indian tribes, and the legislative history
demonstrate that "the McCarran Amendment was meant to be interpreted
narrowly, not broadly." 2 ' Indeed, the true policy underlying the McCarran
Amendment seems to have had nothing to do with Indian tribes who have
sovereign immunity independent of the United States or their rights, which
are reserved by the United States in its sovereign capacity. Instead, the
purpose of the bill was to address the problem that "Congress has not
removed the bar of immunity ... in suits wherein water rights acquired
underState law are drawn in question.", 2 2 The Senators wanted to make sure
the United States accepted the "disabilities as well as ... the benefits" of
these rights. 32 3 The McCarran Amendment "was introduced for the very
purpose of correcting this situation and the evils growing out of such
immunity."324

319 97 CONG. REC. 12,948 (1951) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
320 Hearings, supranote 14, at 15 (statement of Sen. Watkins).
321 Wallace, supr note 1, at 210.
322 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 5 (1951) (emphasis added).

323 Hearings,supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Rep. Yorty).
324 S. REP. No. 82-755, at 5 (1951) (emphasis added).

